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PREFACE
American modal ways and values are subjects of world­
wide interest. The cultural pattern of. the United States' 
mainstream, the numerically-dominant and nationally-pervasive 
middle class, is herein treated and studied as the (majority) 
American ethnic. This mainstream pattern is often used by 
anthropologists, sociologists and others for their bench 
mark of comparison, against which are measured other ethnic 
cultures' patterns and component characteristics— the nature 
of Japanese or Hopi success drives versus the American, or 
old-time Italian extended familialism compared with American 
nuclear family autonomy. In probing and clarifying one 
sector of the American culture's most distinctive or salient 
traits and values, this paper cites evidence and interpre­
tations to give insight into our widely held national image, 
indicating the nature of one area of discrepancy between the 
overt ideal American conception and the covert majority pattern.
Two major trait-values found to be potently linked and 
powerfully decisive in the American pattern are autonomy 
and achievement. They are so strong as to be imperatives 
in most people's lives. Minority groups that do not share 
these (or other first-rank, equally significant trait-values 
such as the nature of family ties, or deferred gratification 
pattern), to the same general extent, intensity, or mode may 
thereby differ sufficiently to be classified as subcultures, 
deviant or pluralistic sub-ethnics, such as the Ghetto-poor,
ii
the Japanese-Americans, and other 'ethnics' like Jewish- 
Americans, Hutterites, and even. Mormons or communal 'Hippies.'
In this study I am indebted especially to Clyde Kluck- 
hohn's pioneering approaches and comprehensive evaluations 
of dominant American values (1958a?1^7)* After review of 
the works on American values in many disciplines, saturation 
reading in American History, and then intensive study of 
empirical investigations, Kluckhohn came to the carefully 
considered conclusion that there is a marked and widely dominant 
set of values, shared extensively, geographically and class- 
wise, although in varying degrees, by the bulk of the United 
States population. He found that there is as much consistency 
and continuity of values and patterns in the American culture 
as there is in the dominant patterns of traits identified 
for the mainstream of England, or Germany, or Japan, or any 
other large-scale ethnic grouping.
While Kluckhohn's treatment was holistic, and he thus 
identified and dealt with at least a score of American 
trait-values considered preeminent, this paper must necessarily 
focus on a manageable section of our cultural components. 
Autonomy and achievement were therefore selected for study 
as two of the most important. However, for wider understanding 
and in search of materials related to the thematic traits, 
this writer has read the full coverage material by Kluckhohn 
and others (listed in the G part of the Bibliography) dealing 
with the major aspects or holistic treatment of the American 
culture.
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Chapter 1
CRYSTALLIZING AND DEFINING THE TRAIT- 
VALUES INITIALLY— RIMROCK
This initial chapter tentatively affixes and clarifies 
the two key trait-values denominated. In it the contrasting 
and varying patterns of the five subcultures found by Vogt 
and Albert (1966) in their study of Rimrock-Homestead, New 
Mexico, in the 1950's is used to identify and define the 
autonomy and achievement complex traits.
Trait— a distinguishing feature_ or quality ; characteristic- 
is used herein roughly synonymously with value— elements in 
social life (ideals, customs, Institutions) towards which 
the people of a group have an affective regard (American 
College Dictionary). Clyde Kluckhohn's definition (Vogt and 
Albert 1966:6) is:
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, 
distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a 
group, of the desirable which influences the selection 
from available modes, means, and ends of action.
Vogt and Albert in part further define their concept of value:
Values...have persistency over time, and 
manifest directionality, an observable consistency 
of response to recurrent situations; and are inter­
related as elements in distinctive patterns or 
systems; i.e., as differentiated but interdependent 
parts of the whole.
Value orientations of selected samples of social groups 
can be identified and compared, as was done in this Rimrock 
study, by interviews, field observations of individuals and 
groups, formal questionnaires (to elicit value choices),
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Rorschach Tests, Magic Man Tests, color charts, tachistopic 
images, tape recordings of small group discussions, or by- 
studies of oral literature— all subject to the anthropologists' 
educated interpretations. Most pioneer studies in social 
anthropology, as Boas et al., used mainly or exclusively 
the first two methods.
The Rimrock-Homestead study was conducted by a team of 
several anthropologists working in the arid Rimrock area, 
a 7000-foot plateau of western New Mexico, near the hamlet 
of Homestead. Five distinct social groupings, comprising
two main culture variations and two or three distinct sub-
/
cultures, of or in acculturation with the American ethnic, 
co-existed and were studied side by side. They weres 2^86 
Zuni Indians (in their ancestral homeland); 625 Navajos 
(in-migrants since 1868); 89 Spanish-Americans, called "Mexi­
cans" (dating from 1865)5 2^1 Mormons (dating from 1882); 
and 232 Panhandle Tex-Oklahomans (some dating from I865 
but mostly forced migrants from the 1930's dust bowl), 
hereinafter referred to as Pantexes. For this paper the 
contrasts and comparisons among all five groups are informative,I
but in particular the divergences between those two groups 
fully enculturated as inheritors and carriers of the American 
ethnic culture— the Mormons and the Pantexes. The authors 
deemed the Pantexes as relatively representative in expressing 
the dominant American cultural norms (though a somewhat 
distinctive Southwest-cum-Ozarks version), at least in dealing 
with autonomy and achievement, and the Mormons as definitely
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somewhat more deviant from mainstream values as intensified 
in their locally-spatially separate subgroup residence and 
association patterns (Vogt 1955*1167). Due to the remoteness 
of the area and isolation from the parent Salt Lake body, 
this group was ultraconservative Mormon in its values and 
therefore in its practices (Vogt & Albert 1966:46-48, 13» 
214).
The study showed that each of the five groups occupied 
a somewhat different ecological niche in the same area; 
that their choices, or resort under pressure, depended on 
their group's patterned solutions based upon values— concep­
tions of the desirable— and that up to the study time each 
tended to hold to its distinctive cultural patterns and 
differing response to the environment. Each group's pattern 
of living and values was consciously a reflection of the 
group's identity. An example of this was illustrated in a 
comparison between dwelling patterns of the Mormons and the 
Pantexes. Although both shared the bulk of their common 
American values, such as the importance of rational mastery 
over nature, of achievement, success, progress, optimism 
(Vogt & O'Dea 1953:648), they diverged when it came to 
individualness (autonomy) versus groupness in coping with 
similar problems.
Illustrative of this divergence were the.contrasting 
settlement and dwelling patterns. The Mormons originally 
laid out their settlement somewhat like an early New England 
Puritan town, with homes grouped regularly within hailing
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proximity. This facilitated cooperative irrigation systems 
and other group endeavors. They have continued to live thus 
in newer settlements despite the shift to non-water-demanding 
dry farming. By contrast, the Pantexes settled Individualistic- 
ally, each nuclear family on its own ranch and homestead, 
dispersed some distance from each other with no effort to 
form a settlement pattern facilitating mutual assistance 
and group demands (Vogt & Albert 1966:171-2). Thus the 
Pantexes, carrying more nearly the central stream of American 
culture, put a high value on being "on their own," not 
closely associated with their neighbors or any community 
(pressure) organization. They prized their autonomy, whereas 
group discipline of the Mormons, reinforced by religious 
conviction, impelled them to partially submerge their 
individual "freedom" (autonomy) for the greater good of the 
group and, incidentally, greater support of the component 
families. This is not a central majority American value 
practice.
Individualism Versus Autonomy
The Rimrock authors strongly stressed that "individual­
ism" and adherence to "independence" are values held very 
highly in the dominant American culture. They noted, through 
systematic observation of conversation and patterns of 
behavior, and through value indicative tests, that the 
Pantexes constituted an archetypical personification of 
these traits. Like classic frontiersmen, they could not 
tolerate living "bunched up" like the Mormons (Vogt & Albert
1966;172).
Although the three terms i nd1v1dualIsm, independence, 
and autonomy can he used to cover the same or overlapping 
areas of. values and consequent behavior, this paper will 
employ the term autonomy. to denote that aspect of individualism 
and independence that has as its foremost goal self-steering-- 
freedom from being steered by any group or person, freedom 
from detailed prescriptions enjoined by perceived social 
institutions. This distinction is necessary because of 
widespread value illusions or confusions between the "overt" 
ideal and the "covert", held for and by the American ethnic* 
this is illustrated in the Pantex's overt conviction that, 
by dwelling physically and organizationally isolated from his 
kind, he was a "free man." In the sense of daily decision 
making, in steering his own and nuclear family life, this 
would be immediately true. But in the sense that each carried 
the same cultural pattern and values that dictated this behavior 
and did not countenance marked individual variations from it, 
each was thereby unknowingly constrained. Thus the Pantexes 
were really not culturally free; they could not deviate 
much from their cultural norms as, for example, to create 
and submit to the discipline of cooperative organizations, 
as did the Mormons. Although "free" to choose among them, 
he was enjoined to participate in one of the range of ten 
fundamentalist-inclined Protestant churches. A man was free 
to choose his own brand, or even fragment a new one (quasi­
individualism) but within the avowed Protestant limits
6
(within the cultural limits of his group, in other words)
(Vogt & O’Dea 1953:651).
Hence, autonomy is herein employed to characterize
that aspect of individuality and independence that cherishes
and emphasizes one's own career, own life deicision-making
and living, apart from others' overt suasion, and without
reference to the compulsion of an organized monitoring social
group— as the religio-social Mormon organization. This
autonomy necessarily involves isolation from fellows; the
degree and kind denotes some of the principal characteristics
of American life. It is latently a reference value embodied
in the old American expression, "Every man for himself, and
1God take the hindmost."
The reader may question whether such an autonomy-oriented 
group could have accomplished as much nationally and indivi­
dually as the Americans have; this problem is considered in 
the concluding chapter.
Of marked significance was the finding that the Bimrock 
Mormons, by virtue of collective plus individual efforts, 
achieved more community benefits and community activities,i
and enjoyed a higher collective and individual economic 
standard, than did the Pantexes. The Pantex farm and business
^The cousins and offspring of these Pantexes "bunched 
up" in heavily urbanized California would seem to have to 
operate from a drastically different ethic, yet in each 
suburban subdivision these same autonomous values, recast 
in urban form, still strongly operate. (See Chapter 3»)
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enterprises were operated according to classic individualistic 
free enterprise principles with only the nuclear family 
cooperating, rarely modified by a limited amount of work 
exchange between kinsmen and neighbors; each nuclear family 
was on its own.
With the Mormons the concept of individual private 
property was strongly modified to include several extended 
family enterprises and several cooperatives for irrigation, 
for town water, and for cattle raising, all encouraged and 
cultivated by an elaborate church-run communal system. The 
Mormons had, in their development under Joseph Smith's
i
tutelage, modified the dominant American pattern by raising 
cooperative institutions to a level equal with individual 
enterprise. The church provided capital and loans to launch 
communal enterprises. Hence, among the Mormons, the American 
ethnic's pervasive autonomy trait was strongly ameliorated 
to the point where each family was not on its own. In this 
respect, the Mormons resembled the Zuni and Navahos (and 
Japanese, and Israelis, and many other cultures) (Vogt &
Albert 1966:187-190, 58).2
2These Pantexes derived from the Southwest Ozark variant 
of the American culture and therefore in their extreme "inde­
pendence" were an exaggerated version of the modal American 
ethnic ("bigger than life"— in other words, beyond the norm). 
In contrast, the Mormons probably derived from the mainstream 
majority Northern culture, hence a comparison between 
Mormons and the mainstream north and west culture would not 
be so sharp. Nonetheless there would be (and is) clear enough 
distinction, as witnessed in Northern California by the 
author— despite the fact that most of the Northern California 
mainstreamers and Mormons alike stem from the Middle West.
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The negative results of the Pantexes' autonomous 
orientation versus the constructive results of the Mormons' 
collective orientation were perhaps magnified in Rimrock to 
an unusual degree. The contrasts were highlighted in several 
similar issues with which each group had to deal. One 
instance occurred in 193^ when the Pantexes had opportunity, 
through the United States Government, to band together and 
buy a large chunk of land suitable for settlement by their 
youth. They failed to organize. The result was that the 
excess population had to drain itself off to the Rio Grande 
Valley and further west to California. When confronted with 
a similar situation in 19^5 to find a place for thirty-two 
returning war veterans, the Mormons successfully negotiated 
a large church loan and bought thirty-eight sections to 
operate as a cooperative in terms of land ownership, but with 
individual ownership of cattle. In so doing they mated cooper-- 
ative and individual values, thus paralleling to some degree 
the system of the Navajo.
Another value-charged situation occurred in 1950 when 
a construction company offered to gravel the Rimrock streets 
for $800.00. The Mormons contracted mutually for this 
improvement for Rimrock. But the Pantexes in nearby Homestead 
were unable to agree on the operation; the upshot was that 
only the individual store owners paid for graveling in front 
of their own places. Another contrast was the response to a 
State offer to contribute toward the building of a high school 
gym if the citizens would provide the labor. In Rimrock,
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under the leadership of the principal, a Mormon leader, 
arrangements were made whereby each able-bodied man either 
worked or contributed $50*00* Although some crayfished, the 
group pressure ultimately told, and the building was completed 
in 1953* In Homestead, however, the Pantexes complained of 
overwhelming burdens in their individual families and ranches; 
they worked only as long as State wages were offered, but 
would contribute no free labor. The gym was only partly 
built; the adobe bricks disintegrated in the rain.
For community dances the Mormons organized a budget of 
$15*00 per year per family. The dances were well-attended 
and served as a significant social outlet fostering intra­
group cohesion. With the Pantexes in Homestead, dances 
were "ad hoc," there was no organization to sponsor, 
attendance was fitful, and festering tensions between families,
incidental to heavy drinking, often erupted into fist-fights
3(Vogt & O'Dea 1953J6^8-651).
Socialization - Autonomous Independence Versus 
Subordinated Interdependence
Vogt and Albert found (1966:91-102) that the sociali­
zation process established these differential values in
3•'These comparisons seem perhaps unrepresentative, 
putting the carriers of the dominant American culture in 
a position of invidious performance inferiority to the 
well-organized Mormons— in this thinly populated backwater 
setting. In other settings the differential gap closes to 
a degree, usually by the tax compulsions of myriad local 
governments enjoining communal measures and so counter-acting 
autonomy in serving community needs. (See in this regard 
Chapter )̂.
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children very early. A comparison of chi Id-raising, practices 
among the Pantexes, Mormons and Zunis makes this clear.
In their push for independence, the Pantexes ended 
breast feeding earliest of the three groups, at a median 
age of nine months (the range for the Pantexes was six to 
thirteen months, which is close to mainstream American 
practice and hence evidence of the normativeness of the 
Pantexes). The Mormons ended breastfeeding at a middling 
median of twelve months (range, eight to seventeen) and the 
Zunis the latest (median., twenty-four months, range twelve to
sixty). Toilet training followed similar curves: the Pantexes
/were the earliest, starting at a median nine months and ending 
at thirteen and one-half months; the Mormons starting at a 
median twelve months, ending at twenty-one months; Zunis 
again the longest, starting at a median eighteen months 
and ending at two and one-half years. The Zunis heavily 
stressed respect and discipline; the Mormons put a fairly 
strong stress on respect and discipline, and demanded especi­
ally getting along with the group. Fighting among children 
was highly discouraged by Zunis and actively discouraged
I
by Mormons. In contrast, the Pantexes thought fighting not 
necessarily a bad, and possibly a good, thing; it was good 
training. Above all, in the Pantex value system, each 
child must be trained to (individually) pull his weight in 
the world. "Sassing’ parents was not condemned by the 
Pantexes, but was abhorred by the Mormons and heavily 
suppressed by the Zunis, with the aid of witches.
11
The autonomous cultural drive of the Pantexes tended 
to stress competition, and begat factionalism and feuding; 
inter-family cooperation was exceptional. In religion, 
for instance, they fractionated into the followings Baptist, 
Presbyterian, Methodist, Nazarene, Campbellite, Holiness, 
Seventh Day Adventist, Present Day Disciples, and even 
Catholic (though these members were considered "lost," 
conversion having stemmed from marriage to a "Mexican"),
The Mormons, secure at the top of the Rimrock area 
cultural-status system, considered the Pantexes rough,
Immoral, and disorganized. However, the Mormons acknowledged 
the Pantexes' more open friendliness. They admired and 
pitied especially the Pantex courage in pitting themselves 
one by one (autonomously) against the harsh, arid, Southwest 
climate and adverse farming conditions. Prom a Mormon 
view, they pitied the Pantexes in their coping with such 
adversity without real divine sustenance, fraternal communion, 
or effective earthly organization (Vogt & O’Dea 1953*651-2).
Achievement - Individual Versus Collective
The mainstream American culture's overlapping association 
and close identification of independence with success is 
perhaps unconsciously illustrated by the authors (Vogt & 
Albert 1966;119) in their statements
That the Texans are extreme with respect to 
childrearing practices that promote a strong 
drive for success is indicated by the age at 
which they wean their children, assuming this is 
the first step in training for independence.
(Italics supplied)
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As analytic observers of the Pantex culture and as members 
themselves of the dominant American ethnic, the writers 
took it for granted that independence and success are to 
be equated or at least are inescapably linked. Numerous 
other cultures do not assume this equation, notably the 
Japanese, where success perforce must normatively be in the 
context of group accomplishments (Goodman 1957» Caudill & 
de Vos 1956)• As noted above, the typical Pantex mother 
viewed 1ndependence in the context of her child being a 
self-starter, being directed toward and equipped for achieving 
and doing things on his own. Most American readers will 
recognize this orientation as so normal, so pervasive, as 
hardly worth mentioning. Here is found reaffirmation 
that this cultural norm, this close identity of autonomy 
and achievement, is a pervasive value tandem operating as a 
basic component unit of those elements which are distinctive 
to the American ethnic's value system. This close identity 
provides a cogent argument for studying these trait-values 
as a joint pair in this paper; to study one without the other 
would be to miss a key relationship.
The Magic Man Test is used to measure the force and 
direction of the achievement drive in children. In it the 
children are asked to make choices as to what they would 
like to be. It has been used cross-culturally by different 
anthropologists, and it has been found to jrield results 
that correlate positively with the results of the Thematic 
Apperception Tests (TAT) following McClelland (see 1961)
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and Whiting and Child (1953)• The test is a measure of a 
'Culture’s values, indicating those goals and statuses 
towards which the society, the adults, have socialized their 
chiIdren.
In comparative Magic Man scoring, Pantex children came 
out with an orientation toward achievement score of 57$,
Mormon 38$, and Zuni 20$. To the query "What kind of person 
would you like to be?" the Mormon children tended to respond 
with ".../be/ good, honest, kind...or fish, run, go swimming," 
whereas the Pantexes aspired to ".../be/ a great doctor in 
the Mayo Clinic...to be a rancher and raise beef cattle so 
I can get some money...a great Yankee baseball player,"
In greatest contrast, the Zuni typically responded "...to be 
a man (or woman)," i,.£., to be a Zuni. It is notable that a 
high proportion of the Pantex childrens' aspiration dreams 
were to excel, to be a success, an individual success, in 
far off places divorced from the fostering community,'. By the 
same token, Pantex children were most eager to grow up (so 
they could achieve these higher statuses), whereas Zuni 
children were quite satisfied as they were (Vogt & Albert 
1966i107-8).
The testers then offered the children, under the heading 
"What is the nicest thing that could happen to you?" the 
choices of Goods, or Stnbus (rich, famous, powerful), or
or Security (not being sick, or punished, or separated 
from the family.) Whereas Zuni children were most tempted 
by Goods— candy, clothes or money— the Mormon girls preferred
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Fun or Security, and the Mormon boys Status gain, but Pantexes,
especially the boys, clearly preferred Status gain (Vogt &
Albert 19661IO9-II).
The authors concluded that for Pantexes, early weaning,
early and strong pressure for self-reliance and individual
achievement, were the child-rearing determinatives of the
ongoing value system, and that success Individually attained
in some high status position was the ultimate goal. Their
study noted that perhaps one-third of the Mormons were
indistinguishable from Pantexes in patterns of early weaning,
and stress on independence, They predicted that in another
generation the Mormon patterns would be indistinguishable
from the general American pattern, as represented by the 
4Pantexes (Vogt & Albert 1966:122),
Summary
This chapter has introduced the thesis that autonomy 
and achievement are linked twin trait values of fundamental 
significance in the Imperative patterns of the American
4This observation and prediction is included herein to 
afford faithful reporting— that Mormons and Pantexes did 
overlap to varying extents, depending on the values in 
question. However, the prediction was probably rash. From 
the author's local (San Francisco Bay area and immediate 
hinterland) observation there i_s convergence, but there is 
still significant distinctive Mormon-type variation in value 
patterns.
Recent studies indicate that Catholics in the United 
States now hold the same value patterns as the mainstream, 
which is historically WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant). 
Thus the Mormons have managed to maintain distinctive 
values whereas the Catholics have not. It may be significant 
that the Mormons are growing in numbers whereas the Catholics 
are diminishing.
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(United States) dominant mainstream culture. The distinction 
has been made between the autonomy characteristic and other 
aspects of individualism and independence. It was stressed 
that American culture distinctively inculcates and operates 
on the expectation that each person is quite separate from 
others. Each is emancipated from binding lineal or collateral 
groups that would directly inhibit the most free exercise 
of individual, egocentric, will— as would obligatory ties and 
duties to kinfolk, cooperative enterprises, and churches 
with strong social demands. It was noted that achievement 
in the American culture is highly correlated with autonomy.
IEach person is expected to achieve high or higher status, 
Independently. He does not advance as a symbiotic participant 
in a kin or other reference group or cohesive ethnic phhlanx 
aiming to reflect pride on, and mutually advance, the family 
or group, as with Levantine Armenians or Japanese. Rather, 
the normative American scrambles through life mostly as a 
lone achiever, divorced from permanent group allegiances 
or identities except for the minimum of his fleeting nuclear 
family. ('
The micro-society sample findings of the Rimrock study 
indicated and illustrated these points, with the settlers 
from the Oklahoma-Texas Panhandle identified as archetypically 
representative of the dominant American values. The more 
group-oriented and constrained Mormons were found to be 
in partial contrast as to life styles, but in marked contrast 
in the trait-values in question. For, though the Mormon
16
culture and Pantex culture generally carried the same American 
values on the whole, the Mormons deviated significantly 
in consciously and successfully raising collective values 
and constraints and resultant behaviors to a level approaching 
equal status with individual achievement. Thus the contrast 
highlighted the subject values. The Zuni's values served as 
an opposite pole of contrast, being highly anti-autonomy, 
and pervasively group-obligations-oriented.
The Rimrock study was based not only on interviews, 
participant observation, and questionnaires, but also on 
Rorschach and Magic Man testing.
In the subsequent chapter possible historical roots of 
this autonomy-achievement trait complex will be offered. •
Then an array of more detailed and wider-ranging international 
cross-cultural studies, containing comparisons with data, 
will be analyzed. Pinally, recent manifestations of these 
trait-values and their configuration in contemporary urbanized 
American society will be delved into and assessed.
Chapter 2
HISTORICAL CLUES AND POSSIBLE ANTECEDENTS:
AUTONOMY AND ACHIEVEMENT
Purpose
This Chapter seeks possible and likely antecedents 
marking the origins and development of Autonomy and Achieve­
ment in the American culture. The findings and interpreta­
tions of modern scholars as Seymour Lipset, Jules Henry,
Cora Dubois and Bernard Bailyn— respectively a Sociologist, 
two Anthropologists, and a Social Historian— are presented. 
These and other contemporary specialists studied early 
historical records, and firsthand (1750-18^0) observer 
accounts such as those of Alexis De Tocqueville, Harriet 
Martineau and others. They weighed and compared the findings- 
of these early observers, seeking regularities in behavior 
that persisted through generations. At length, after 
rigorous examination and evaluation, they came to similar 
conclusions. They found distinctive American trait-values 
that operated pervasively, regularly and consistently!as 
manifest in the ways and aspirations of several successive 
generations. They found a cultural pattern.
Nuclear Con,jugal Units - Self Petermination
The authors of the Rimrock .study attached considerable 
significance to the normative American rural dwelling pattern
17
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as typified by the Pantexes’ mode of homesteading and main­
tenance of separate dwellings, through many generations.
Each lived on his own farm, an average of one mile from 
each other. A study of American history indicates that, 
apart from the early Puritan settlements and the protective 
stockade of certain other early settlers, individual voluntary 
isolation was the typical American pattern. In Rimrock the 
Pantexes thought that such isolation produced independent, 
resourceful, autonomous people, since the family, and 
especially the children, lived their daily lives somewhat 
sequestered from, and independent of, one another. This was 
in complete contrast to the nearby Mexican or Spanish 
village, Atrisco, where homes were grouped closely into a 
village pattern, and the workers made daily work trips 
into the surrounding fields (Vogt & Albert 1966:166), following 
the millenial patterns of Spain and Italy, and southern 
Europe in general.
Conrad Arensberg (1955:11^3-61) dubbed this pattern 
of individual dispersed farms and farmsteads Einzelhof.
He stated that the pattern antedated the birth of American 
culture. It had been established historically all along 
the Atlantic "seawall" from Berber Africa north through 
Atlantic Spain and the Celtic lands (but not England?) to 
northwest Europe. Thus, he believed, the pattern was brought 
to America by Dutch, Rhinelanders and Scots-Irish. It was 
later confirmed by such acts as the post-Revolutionary War 
western land grants to ex-soldiers, and by the Homestead
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Acts- of the 1860s, which further facilitated the trend toward 
continuing dispersal. He noted that pioneers went west as lone 
individuals or as minimal nuclear families, loosely associated 
in groups without ordered clustering or fixed membership.
The interpretation is thus that the major non-English 
Immigrant cultures brougnt to America this pattern of dispersed 
settlement coupled with its associated livelihood values, 
and that the unique opportunities of a rich and wide-open 
frontier afforded optimum opportunity to this trend toward 
individualized sequestered farmsteads. Prom this evidence
it would appear that the village-bound English traits could,
/
in a few generations, :■ shift to the Einzelhof pattern. Such 
a pattern would be likely to favor individualistic traits over 
patterns and institutions of collective mutual help and 
constraint. Factors such as virtually free land, great 
geographic mobility, and the economic ease of setting up 
independent households seem to have favored rapid growth of, 
and shift toward, this mode of living and its attendant 
values (Vogt & Albert 1966:11^4— 116, citing Bailyn 1960j23).
Vogt and Albert attributed part of this atomistic or 
individualization development to the abrupt break-up of the 
Elizabethan extended family, incidental to relocation in 
the New World, but it is more likely that such extended 
kinship ties had been weakened or terminated long before
The Donner-Reed overland party, whose membership 
almost entirely succumbed to starvation in the California 
Sierras in 18^6, illustrated this loose transitory affiliation 
pattern.
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the American settlement. This breakup of ties plus the 
peculiarly American factors cited might help explain why 
the settlement of the South African frontier by the Dutch 
Boers and the Siberian frontier by the Russians did not 
produce the same individualistic patterns of nuclear family 
dwelling and livelihood, nor any approximate degree of 
autonomous individualistic values (Hofstadter & Lipset 
1968:9-13» I65~l67). It could be that the relative safety 
and possibility of individual emigration from England and 
Northwest Europe to America fostered an unbounded individual­
ness in the migration. Also, the "escape" to the New World 
may have selectively attracted a significant proportion of 
anti-authority, anti-compulsion types of personalities that 
deviated somewhat from their normative home-cultures in 
being anti-authority, anti-constraint in orientation. England 
in Elizabethan and later times had a significant share of 
anti-authority, rebellious, and major and minor criminal 
types of people.
It seems logical to say that, whereas a large extended 
family dwelling unit perforce needed to suppress intra-group 
aggression, as with the Zunis and pre-Elizabethan English, 
a family reduced to the United States dominant nuclear 
conjugal, unit had fewer such pressures and could give vent 
to or even encourage aggressiveness, individual-oriented 
effort, and, ultimately, individual careers. The historic 
18th century pattern was for each excess child in growing 
up to forsake his parental home and settled neighborhood for
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the'frontier to make his own way. Such pattern would also 
foster the bent of "This new man, this American" to oppose 
overt authority constraint and collective institutions, since 
this new American modal personality was at least shaped by such 
institutional pressures--in comparison to most societies.
Independent Self-Starting; Bent Nurtured
Studies of Elizabethan English precepts to parents
disclosed that these ancestral patterns stressed obedience
and the dampening of aggressiveness. Following this value
pattern English colonies in the l600's and 1700's in
Massachusetts passed numerous laws designed to reinfdrce
family, and especially patriarchal family, authority. Schools
were set up in considerable part to attempt reinforcement
2of these old values. Although the town fathers struggled 
for community retention of their European-based value ideals 
of deference to father and obedience to authority and community 
constraint values, these values and thei.. practices were, 
in the l600's and 1700's, eroded rapidly. Young parents 
moved away from the traditional influences of grandparents
I'and away from the mores reinforcement of surrounding close-in 
public opinion (Bailyn 1960:25-26).
First the confines of the 1000-year-old village in England 
were escaped; then the 50-year-old township in Massachusetts
2Note that from the beginning American schools were 
conceived not just for skills teaching but for socialization 
along the lines and values targeted by the representative 
school boards.
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was forsaken. New settlements were made and new authority
established, but there was a slippage, an erosion of
authority all along the way. In typical continuation of
these American patterns that had evolved, the 1950*s
Pantexes stressed individual initiative and independence as
much higher values than obedience (Chapter 1). In contrast,
the Mormons, in accord with their preceptor Joseph Smith,
consciously sought to return to the early New England
and English Puritan family values. The Mormons deviated
from the American mainstream in several ways, some dating
to their beginnings in the 1830's and lSkO's. Not the
least divergence was apparent in their adherence to close
community ties, family and group discipline, subordination
3of the individual to the group.
Murray G. Murphey (1965:1^-163) reviewed accounts 
of America written about 1800. He found that foreign 
observers noted extreme permissiveness of parents, absence 
of deference to authority, lack of parental authority, 
but - at the same time they also observed ability of the
^"Go West"t This contrast was graphically illustrated 
in the 1846-^9 Western prairie and mountain crossing 
where the disciplined, prudent, group-oriented Mormons 
lost not a single man nor suffered much hardship on their 
trek to Utah, whereas the individualistic trekkers to 
California and Oregon suffered and died extensively.
However, under institutional discipline select volunteers 
of this self-reliant dominant culture were able to defeat 
the individualistic, rather disorganized and fractioned 
Mexican armies--perhaps showing a latent American capacity 
to selectively accept, and be subordinate to, constraint 
institutions of government, at least sporadically (Potter 1962). However, the later brigades of the 1856 Mormon "hand­
cart1 migration lost trekkers due to a late August start and 
poor provision.
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children to take care of themselves, precocity and early 
maturity. Harriet Martineau (English writer, 1802-1876) 
likewise observed that American children were left to a 
considerable extent to their own development, that their 
early training was to maximize activity and independenfce 
(Lipset 1963:120 citing Martineau 1837:14-15)• Upset 
also noted that Max Berger, quoting Marryat (1943) and Dixon 
Wecter (1937)» had found corroborative evidence in the 
evaluations of several other European observers that American 
children were seen to be undisciplined, aggressive, indepen­
dently capable, self-willed, and spoiled. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Sr., affirmed roughly the same views, citing 
J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, 1783, and James Bryce,
1888 (1943:225-244). De Tocqueville (French nobleman 
writer, 1805-1859) found mistrust of authority even in 
schools where the children made up their own rules in games 
(Lipset 1963:122).
Observations of Autonomous Independence
Jules Henry cited that portion of Alexis De Tocque- 
ville's 1831 evaluation of American society wherein the 
latter admired the courage of each man, each conjugal family, 
fighting life alone, but mourned that nobody was compelled 
to help his neighbor nor could expect much help. Equality 
of opportunity was thought to offer a fair chance to all.
De Tocqueville felt that such value practices produced 
much self-reliance. Henry adduced that the origins of 
this individual drive for achievement, for acquiring mastery
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over-the environment and over one's own life, came from the 
circumstances of the suppressed peoples of (Northwest)
Europe being suddenly released^ (1936:5-6). With l40 
years of hindsight, historians feel that De Tocqueville's 
observations and analysis of American character are a start- 
lingly accurate appraisal of the on-going American character. 
Moreover, recent studies of American value patterns tend to 
show a great deal of continuity in values from De Tocque- 
ville's time to the near present. Lipset holds that the 
basic core values of the American character are unchanging, 
that the character may take new forms, but the basic value 
imperatives tend to continue through generations (1963:110).
Factors such as the salient aspect of the autonomous 
personality noted— the extreme self-reliance imperative and 
the unwillingness to submit to institutions of community 
obligation as policing, the lack of help from others— paints 
a picture somewhat at odds with the conventional, nostalgic 
American folk image of cooperative group barn raisings, 
exchange of farm work and equipment. * Though there is 
evidence of some practice of and value in informal mutual 
help and ad hoc neighborliness, there is also evidence
4In Henry1 s view this independent drive to mastery 
and urge for individual self-advancement became so plausible 
and possible with the richness of the continent to exploit, 
that it inculcated a permanent, greedy acquisitiveness, 
a vice— consumerism--that lies at the root of many of our 
ills. The notion is not central to this thesis, though 
it may or may not have merit.
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presented below of counter traits. Marion Pearsall stated 
that the typical American frontier model developed all along 
the Appalachian Mountain edge. Then it flowed westward 
from the Middle Atlantic Fringe through the Southern Appa­
lachians into the Ohio Valley, northwestward into the 
Middle West, and southwestward between 1820-1860 into the 
Ozarkian regions of Missouri and Arkansas and East Oklahoma 
and Texas. In so doing it carried along the ancestral 
culture of the Pantexes. In the more open country locations, 
wider communication and later urbanization influences modified 
the ancestral patterns somewhat toward more constraint 
and volunteer fire department type of cooperation. But, 
Pearsall stated, in the Appalachian coves the folk retained 
the old unchanged patterns of culture, unrefined, for a 
longer period of time.
From his studies of sources contemporary with 1820- 
1860, Pearsall found that his adjudged archetypical segment 
of the American culture, the trans-Appalachian society in 
its "purest" state, was composed of autonomous neighborhoods, 
consisting of small, shifting,'diffuse, atomistic groups.
These were subject to frequent disintegration as communities, 
especially as the soil was exhausted and folk moved on.
He found that each frontiersman was supposed to take care 
of himself and expected others to do the same; that relations 
between households were frequently hostile. The cooperation 
that did occur tended to follow kinship lines. Families 
would sometimes band together to set up schools and churches,
26
but tended to break apart easily (,1966s 128-1^1) $ "Inde- 
pendent" was the ideal value, the Leitmotiv.̂  Pastors and 
schoolmasters historically lived very insecure.existences- 
as did their independent employers.
Converse Aspects of Inde^endence: Isolation,
Cultural and "Peer xressure
Although these aforesaid American trait values of 
autonomous achievement helped to produce some of the most 
capable-seeming, enterprising, energetic and achieving 
people on earth, paradoxically these traits produced also 
serious weaknesses. Though the resultant or associated 
American political culture became outstanding in the world 
for wealth, accomplishments, individual freedoms, and 
swiftly evolved national image of idealistic humanity 
coupled with pragmatic opportunism, still these penetrating 
observers of the national character noted an unexpected 
set of inhibitions and impediments. They found associated 
factors engendering a debilitating insecurity that in some 
personalities amounted to a crushing burden.
^This is reminiscent of a 1971 fission of a Livermore 
(northern California) Baptist church, where a fraction disliking 
the Pastor's views (and behavior) split off and set up an 
"independent" church. This fractionization of congregation- 
run churches has been typical of American social patterns.
It continues to go on here in this ultimate mani-festation 
of American culture, California— especially from the more 
frontier-traditioned or southern value-carrying churches.
6The term "independent" has great value significance 
in the American culture and is frequently employed in situa­
tions like the above to signify breaking off and opposition 
to something rejected.
2?
According to Bailyn those cultural forces which
Continually pressed the normative American toward individual
autonomy and achievement tended to heighten the individual's
sense of separateness, causing him to look upon society
from without, as a non-member, rather than from within.
The community and its embodiment, the State, seemed external,
artificial. The institutions of government and religion
did not belong to or embrace the individual. Therefore he
was isolated and alone (i960:25-26). Thus if he suffered
7any setback— "bad; luck," accident, disease, or failure to 
achieve--the American was quite alone. He had few family 
or group ties to sustain him (Henry 196656 citing De 
Tocqueville).
Despite this feeling of exclusion (or perhaps because 
of it), despite this stress on "independence," the American 
pattern produced a paradoxical strong need to conform to 
the values of the group. These normative group values were 
not devolved from those of the respected elites, as in 
De Tocqueville's France or in most prior societies, but 
arose from the mass, the awesome tyranny of beer-group 
pressure. Martineau claimed in 1837 that Americans were very
7In Himrock "bad luck", adverse nature, was advanced 
by the Pantexes.as understandable reason for failure, whereas 
any acknowledgement of human failing, or lack of either 
competence or "gumption", would, have been an intolerable 
burden to the self-image shaped from childhood and through 
many generations toward success (Vogt & Albert 1966:124).
///
/
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fearful of the opinions of others, especially of being 
considered singular (unusual, nonconformist, "oddball" in 
the current lexicon). She held that they "wore chains of 
repression" imposed by intolerant collective standards of 
behavior. A German traveler, Francis J. Grund, stated in 
the 1830's that Americans operated in the fear and appre­
hension that their actions, opinions, and beliefs might be 
condemned by their fellows. James Bryce (British writer, 
1838-1922) likewise encountered in America a strong tendency 
to accept and fall in line with the dominant opinion— much 
more so than in Britain (Lipset 1936:108— Martineau /l833s 
14-15. 177* Mesick /1922:3017, Grund /1959:52, 157. l62j, 
Bryce /1912 :351-2.7).
Clyde Kluckhohn also agreed with'De Tocqueville's 
estimate, citing his conclusion that even though in America 
"the will of a'man was not shattered," nevertheless his 
fate was shaped and guided. The popular will forced 
conformity. "Mavericks" were free to think differently 
and. still retain life and property, but they henceforth 
became strangers to their own people, subject to social' 
scorn and ostracization. Kluckhohn accepted this judgment 
to a degree, but not fully. He affirmed the anti-higher 
"establishment" value but also the parochial subordination 
of Americans to standards that were strongly defined and 
enjoined by public approval; that
while Americans do not easily accept authority from 
above, they have ever been highly vulnerable to the 
impersonal and unorganized authority of their 
social environment (1958a:186).
29
Thus the need for social approval, based on approval of one's 
peers, even in semi-isolated settings, appears to have been
a factor negating and corrosive of the mythological, complete,
!
"mountain man" independence. Even in the carving out of 
autonomous careers there had to be validation from the 
approval of others— the society. Hence the basic form of 
independence always bore its flawed contrary side producing 
a vulnerability to public opinion that eroded and countered 
deeper self-direction and weakened self-respect.
Wider Historical Hindsights
In comparing American culture with that culture most 
closely related, the English Canadian, Lipset (1964s173- 
192) found significant differences, rooted originally in 
the American "independent" (anti-authority) values growing 
out of the aforementioned early (pre-1800) transoceanic 
and value-shaping frontier influences. Unlike the Canadian, 
these values were reinforced by the successful anti-government, 
anti-authority ideology of the American Revolution. These 
established cultural patterns were then further reinforced
i'
in the 19th and 20th centuries by the American romanticization 
of the aggressively independent, capable frontiersman, followed 
by the gun-wielding lone cowboy, imposing his own concept 
of law. In contrast, the later-settled, more evolutionary 
Canadian society was more willing to accept official author­
ity, . characterized by the institution-backed, community- 
approved, romantic but institutional authority figure, the 
Canadian Mount!e.
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Clyde Kluckhohn's extensive survey of the whole body 
of literature on American values, consisting of scores of 
observations and evaluations by many different authors, 
disclosed to his satisfaction that "in broad outline there 
is remarkable agreement upon their stability through more 
than one hundred and fifty years" (1958a;1^9)- Carefully 
he questioned whether the early observers might have been 
contaminated in their objectivity by one another, and 
particularly whether they had all derived from De Tocqueville. 
He concluded that most had not heard of one another, and 
some had never even encountered De Tocqueville's writings; 
yet they arrived at generally approximate or overlapping 
conclusions.
While this paper can handle only one segment of the 
significant American values— autonomy and achievement—  
a brief review of the compass of significant values found by 
Kluckhohn and affirmed by other scholars will give the 
reader a clearer idea of the relationship of autonomy and 
achievement to the whole. The valuesomost commonly listed 
as especially characteristic of the American set were; 
individualism, pragmatism (especially mechanical ingenuity), 
hard continuous work, optimism, change-as-desirable, gener­
osity (compassion), idealism, deference to women, wasteful • 
living, pursuit of pleasure, social and geographic mobility 
(change-is-good syndrome?). Squally important were: the
acquisitive spirit, grasp on possessions-property, perfect- 
ability (limitless improvement, hope and expectation),
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high moralism, a paradoxical mixture of lawlessness (anti­
authority) with ostensible reppect for law and order 
(Kluckhohn 1958a:150).
Summary
This chapter has sought historical clues and scholarly 
assessments as to the derivation of the Pantex culture 
and in particular of the traits of Autonomy and Achievement. 
The assumption was that the main thread of American culture 
had stemmed from England, since 60% of the 17?6 colonial 
population were English, and since British institutions and 
values dominated every one of the thirteen original states. 
Historical authorities such as Bailyn were therefore examined 
to recognize the American transformation. These sources 
showed how the thematic trait-values developed apace with 
the transformation of the semi-group-constrained English 
villagers of 1600 into the 1750 Appalachian-breaching, 
independently operating individuals and nuclear family units, 
who were each carving a westward destiny. The possibility 
was suggested that the mother country's patterns were already 
well along the road to individualistic capitalism and 
autonomous careers torn loose from, family ties. Also, 
the possibility was indicated that selective emigration 
plus the New World's individualistic economic opportunities 
and lack of group controls greatly accelerated these inci­
pient trends.
In order to test these ideas, a comparison was made 
between the Pantexes' values and patterns of behavior and
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those patterns observed in America during the 19th century 
by foreign travelers. The findings of these observers 
such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Harriet Martineau, after 
"jelling" for $0 to 100 years, were critically sifted by 
modern scholars such as Seymour Lipset and Clyde Kluckhohn, 
whose analyses were used in this chapter. The values and 
behavior patterns found in Rimrock were already largely 
recognizable 150 years earlier, in the eastern United States, 
though some of them in Rimrock were found to be exaggerated 
or in inbred-backwater form. Corroborative characteristics 
confirmed in both places included early weaning, encouragement 
of independent child development, precocity, comparative 
"disrespect" for elders and authority, weak family ties, 
great store on self-reliance.
These observers also uncovered an authority factor 
that American society itself did not fully appreciate: the
pervasive "tyranny of the major!ty"--the internal need and 
social necessity for conforming in values and behavior to 
the’ will of the society expressed by public approval/ 
disapproval under the dire penalty of social ostracization.
It would appear that despite the Americans' vaunted and 
cherished independence in decision-making and career orien­
tation, few persons could withstand that pressure. This 
is a pan-anthropological phenomenon; that is, powerful 
group pressure for conformity is intrinsic to most, if not 
all, societies. It is worthy of note here because observers 
found that American society believed its members to be
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freer of constraint than those of any other society.
This chapter restressed a subordinate point of Chapter 
1, that the autonomy of the individual bordered in many 
cases on isolation of the individual, alienation from 
institutions and fellowship, and put on him the unrelieved 
burden of coping alone.
For breadth, the Americans were contrasted with English- 
speaking Canada to show how the varying historical experience 
of Revolution and unpollced frontiers greatly fostered 
the development of the autonomous values of the Americans, 
but lack of revolution and the more controlled development 
kept, or turned, the Canadians toward more respect for 
constituted authority patterns. For further breadth, an 
excerpt of Clyde Kluckhohn's extensive survey of the American 
culture's value history was set forth (1) to reinforce the 
above findings, and (2) to let the reader see some of the 
scope of the wide and distinctive set of characteristic 
American values that are recognized, of which autonomy and 
achievement are basic determinative elements.
At the conclusion of this historical chapter it is 
possible to project these trait trends into the national 
future. How well do these traits/values serve, these 
cultural determinants of individual success or debilitating 
insecurity, when added up into a national society of aggre­
gate achievement or composite vulnerability? How well do 
they equip the United States, with its version of competition 
versus cooperation, to compete with the collaterally rein­
forced, highly cooperative Japanese society, and with the
fully collateralized, totalitarian Asian Communist societies?
Chapter 3
VALUES VALIDATED— THE INVERSE RECIPROCALS
Overview and Cross-Cultural
Purpose and Methods. This chapter provides a variety 
of supporting material amplifying the thematic Rimrock findings 
as to the extent, nature, and significance of autonomy and 
achievement trait-values. In it the historical findings and 
judgements of Chapter 2 are checked against 20th century 
findings for long-run validity using the interpretations of 
numerous contemporary anthropologists and sociologists. Herein 
are presented the findings of Walter Goldschmidt, Margaret 
Mead, David McClelland, Yehudi Cohen, George de Vos, Francis 
L. K. Hsu, Margaret Clark, and others in their subject areas.
Some findings, like those of Goldschmidt, Florence Kluck­
hohn, and Mead, are based mainly on the trained anthropolo­
gists’ participant observations, in effect the fruition of 
many earlier supporting studies. Other interpretations like 
those of Alex Inkeles, are based on an intensive clinical 
psychological cross-cultural study program employing long 
written questionnaires, detailed life history interviews, 
a battery of tests: Rorschach, TAT, sentence completion,
projective question, and problems-situations (e.g., Russians 
versus Americans).
The concomitant purpose of this chapter is to denominate, 
sharpen and affirm those corollary trait-values that, in this
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American pattern, seem to be the flawed side— a negative 
reciprocal product of the much admired autonomy (independence) 
and achievement. These consist of the interlocked inverse 
traits of conformity (need and practice), isolation, frustra­
tion, weakened self-esteem, and need for approval and recog­
nition— found especially by contrast with societies that put 
less value on autonomous achievement. In Chapter 2 some of 
these reciprocals were stressed historically— as in Bailyn 
and De Tocqueville. Each inverse reciprocal trait-value 
herein has been adduced by more than one expert, hence is 
set forth here as a likely hypothesis. Other more controversial, 
anti-social, personality-corrosive findings, as Jules Henry's 
on excessive greed and Kluckhohn's (19^1 ) on weaknesses in 
internalized social control,^ are reserved for Chapter ^ .
Mobility and Impermanence were always core character­
istics of the Americans, according to Walter Goldschmidt 
(1955*1209-1217). He held that American culture was built 
on mobility— historical, geographical, and social. The 
normative individual had the urge and, more often than in 
most societies, the possibility of moving out from an oppres­
sive or "intollerable" situation (1955:1213). (What is deemed 
intolerable might be a function of the values— such as built- 
in resignation as opposed to a socially approved value of 
non-acceptance of "fate", the expectation that anyone with
1These early Kluckhohn writings were more harshly critical, 
more in the vein of a "sick society", than those of his mature 
years. He wrote first at the end of the Great Depression, in 
the late 1930s— a time of doubting, as were the 1960's and early 
1970's.
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"gumption" should be capable of breaking out of Unpalatable 
situations. ) The effect of this mobility was to undermine 
group identity, sense of community, allegiance to the home­
town. In the United States a hometown was the place to come 
from; in traditional China the place to return to (Thomas 
Wolfe, You Canj t Go_ Home Again). So individual mobility 
tends to undermine group ties and belonging. It fosters 
autonomy.
Achieved Status-Ultimate Worth were, according to Gold­
schmidt (1955:1215), determined In American society's standards
largely by the individual himself, with the possible exception/
of those starting their careers, their "race of life" at the 
very top--possibly a Nelson Rockefeller or a Jack Kennedy?—  
and those at the very bottom— types like Arthur Bremer (Wallace 
assassin). Consequently, if a man by middle age had not 
achieved much status, he obviously had not much worth, since 
achievement equals both social and self worth ("He never 
amounted to anything.") By middle age and retirement this 
apparent or relative failure begot grave psychic disorder 
aad depression (see later discussion of the relative position 
of the aged in American society, in this chapter). This
Unlike more static cultures, Americans have rated 
resignation low on the value scale; it is deemed by the 
majority as suitable only for the aged and infirm and the 
sequestered religious (but very hard even for this last 
group to accept).
. Spurning one's apparent lot and reshaping one’s destiny, 
creating one's own lifepath, has been a keystone of the 
American experience. One shall win mastery over nature and 
adversity.
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system, where the individual's evaluation of his own self- 
worth Is based on his personal relative achievements, produces 
much achievement but also much personal and family tension 
and anxiety, and ultimate disappointment.
Margaret Mead in 19^1 (Kluckhohn et ajL. 1967:663-670) 
set forth two significant peculiarities of American character 
structure s
(1) its emphasis on moral choice, and
(2) its dependence upon achievement measured against 
the achievement of near equals (1967:665).
She held that achievement was measured comparatively, 
not against the father, because his achievement would be 
already outmoded, but against the achievements of one's 
siblings and peer group. She held that peer group standards 
were the meaningful ones by which Americans measured themselves 
and their "progress". All were expected to progress. Her 
explanation was that change was so rapid in the United States 
that parental standards, and those of prior generations, were 
inadequate. Here we have a rephrasal of De Tocqueville's 
"tyranny of the majority", and an affirmation of his obser­
vation that the peer group sets the standards; by implication 
said group is the reference point from which to win approval 
and regard. Mead's stress that this occurred because of the 
rapidity of change is somewhat circular. Perhaps, as suggested 
in Chapter 2, in the two factors--the historic rejection of 
authority plus the concomitant optimistic belief in change 
for change's sake, change as progress— are found key elements 
in the unremitting thrust to aspire higher to win regard, if
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not renown. Thus in the dominant pattern a lifespan is looked♦
upon as a long competitive race with one's peers. The race is 
rendered more uncertain by the constant necessity for side­
long checks with the field to see in which direction the 
race is currently veering— in technology, in shifts of popular 
approval— for fear that, as front runner, one will be marooned 
in a suddenly obsolete direction or position.
Mead also stated, as a second reason, that this peer-set 
standard arises due to the diversity of American national 
backgrounds (“The old man is stupid, he doesn't even speak 
good English or know his way around.") However, the historic 
evidence presented in Chapter 2, and that of the Anglo- 
antecedented Pantexes in Chapter 1 tends to discount this 
aspect; even with the same English (or fully WASP-assimilated)' 
background these patterns of autonomous achievement and peer 
reference were well established in the American ethnic during
3the colonial period.
In considering comparative legal systems Yehudi Cohen
(1966:239-2^1) stated that:
...a central theme in interpersonal relationships 
is the individual's need in the United States fo,r 
independence and autonomy, a fear of too close 
association with other individuals and groups.
Lately in television programs and popular magazines 
Margaret Mead has carried her youth-patronizing theme to the 
extreme--tbat (American) culture is continually obsolete, 
the young must make up culture (the values) as they go.
She appears to be unduly minimizing the psychic and value 
continuities in even American culture, and the potential 
psychic crack-ups, social disorganization and anomie if 
discontinuities multiply and feverish rejection of social 
values becomes widespread.
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Where an individual assumes responsibility for other 
members he throws his emotional lot in with the rest 
of the group. Where he does not assume such responsi­
bilities, he plays a lone emotional game (1966:241).
Cohen stated that unlike the situation in traditional or
collective-oriented socieities, an American man and wife are
not responsible for each other's criminal actions, siblings
have no legal liability or responsibility for each other's
actions at any time in their lives. Children are not responsible
for Itheir parents (except for some "antiquated" laws, no longer
effectively enforced, that insist that destitute, aged parents
are supposed to be partially supported. This constitutes
a lingering pro-forma survival, a relic of an obsolete social
obligation).
Cohen's "lone emotional game" is echoed or pre-figured
in Jules Henry's specific restatement of De Tocqueville:
that Americans feared holding unpopular opinions, had little
involvement with persons outside their immediate family,
had sustaining relations only with a narrow coterie of
friends. De Tocqueville said that, in extremis, the American
had the feeling that one stands alone, no one really cared
4whether one lived or died (Henry 1966:105-106).
Russian comparison: Alex Inkeles, et ajL., (Kluckhohn
& Murray 1964:577-592) employed elaborate diagnostic test 
methods--questionnaires, life history interviews, Rorschach*
4An American reader might react that, isn't this the 
human condition?--which reaction only tends to affirm that 
there i_s a dominant American pattern of values. For other 
culture's in the world do not so feel, at least feel it less 
strongly.
TAT, sentence completion test, and problems situation tests—  
to ascertain values of a group of Russians who incidental to 
World War II had fled west. His study group compared these 
tests results with those of a representative and matched 
group of Americans. They found that Americans had a much 
greater need for achievement, that.thfey had a much greater 
need for approval and recognition, but paradoxically they 
feared involvement ("don’t get involved"). The Russians 
felt the need to belong to groups and have close interpersonal 
contacts with people. In contrast, the Americans feared too 
close or intimate relationships as potentially freedom-inhi­
biting, a burden of obligation, a personality threat. The 
Russians welcomed such contacts. Yet Americans needed 
to be liked as "all right guys" and they greatly feared 
isolation from the group.
Paradox; Modal folk in both cultures had need for 
sustaining contact with their fellow man beyond the nuclear 
family. Whereas the Russian culture recognized this need 
and people had institutionalized and participated in group 
contacts to fill it, the American culture's dominant value 
of independence overtly scorned the need for such contacts, 
sub- or semi-consciously, however, the American need was 
apparently powerful and expressed itself in the need for 
approval by peers, and fear of rejection.^
^"A Nation of Joiners" is often a characterization 
of the Americans, but in this writer's view this is greatly 
exaggerated or is pro-forma. The average man is no_t active 
in a volunteer organization /Footnote cont'd on following page./
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Couched another way: In the American culture there
existed (and probably continues to exist) a dependent corollary 
to auto-achievement, namely an unseen, generally unnoted but 
blindly felt, almost lemming-like compulsion toward surrogate 
collaterality— a substitute social group meeting a possibly 
innate need for group ties--and toward value conformity.
This compulsion exists despite the overt condemnation of 
more openly practiced patterns of conformity when Americans 
adjudge other cultures— as can be seen in statements like, 
"Japanese businesses or government can't reach a decision 
until all hands have hashed it over forever and a consensus 
is reached," or "When you meet a Filipino he seems to have 
cousins upon cousins to the 'nth degree, each of which has 
some claim on him," or "Those Japanese tourists in Hawaii 
all go about in disciplined groups, each pointing his camera 
on the suggestion of the leader." Here seems to be an 
ambivalence or discordance to be examined in the exploration 
a rd:evaluation ‘section, Chapter 4. It would appear that few 
Americans are strong enough-to stand on their own autonomy. 
Eccentricity, or going against the group values and expec­
tations, is hazardous to the psyche and to the career.
German comparison: This unique American culture emerged
300 years ago from predominant English patterns which in 
turn stemmed 1̂ 4-00 years ago from the value systems of Anglo-
/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ and club. True, 
that minority of our society who are members of the Elks,
Rotary, Masons, Legion, Barbershop Quartets, do get some 
group rapport, but not to any significantly sustaining degree. 
Only the minorities of highly member-involved religious groups—  
Mormons, Hutterites, Black Moslems— approach this sustaining 
degree, and thereby approach deviant sub-cultural status.
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Saxon, Germanic tribesmen of A. D. 400. The reader, therefore, 
would expect the American and English, and to a slightly 
greater degree, the German, to have a closer congruence of 
values than the American and Russian, or American and 
Japanese. McClelland (1964:65-74, and 1961:197-198) cited 
a study by McClelland, Sturr, Knapp and Wendt (1958)» 
where investigators matched two sets of high school boys 
aged 16-19 (both pre-selected elites— private school in the 
United States and Gymnasium in Germany) using open ended 
fantasy tests such as "What are the three things you would 
most like to teach your children?" This was supplemented by 
a direct answer questionnaire. They found that the Americans 
had a much greater need for, or interest in, achievement, in 
the ratio of 4.7 to 2.7. said drive was ego-centered, anti­
group. However, McClelland thought this feature, which he 
deemed "selfish, self-seeking," was ameliorated and counter­
acted by a correspondingly high degree of group-centered 
activities like team sports and clubs, school publications 
and religious associations, drama, and service organizations.
In this comparison the ratio was 5 times as much American 
adolescent participation as German, whose extra-curricular 
activities tended to be reported as more individual— pursuits 
such as hiking or reading. The American data indicated 
that the Imperative was to develop oneself unilaterally—  
to achieve— was rendered more social, was checked and 
channeled by the necessity of conforming to the opinions of 
other participants. In McClelland’s (too neat) aphorism:
...So while the German engages in more individual­
istic activities he has a greater sense of his 
obligations to others, whereas the American has 
a greater sense of obligation to himself, which 
is held in check by participation in many group 
activities (1961:198).
The paradox here is that the American in his ethos, self- 
image, puts a premium on exercising his free choice while 
the German, in making choices, admittedly tends to defer to 
authority— elders, experts. Ironically, the American 
•'freely chooses" what others expect him to choose, he 
accedes to majority standards although by a round-about, 
somewhat self-deluding route. So, while an American will 
tend to resist overt pressure to do thus and so, the cumu­
lative or subtle group pressure tends to make him conform 
"voluntarily." To do otherwise would be to risk being 
"oddballed", excluded, not well-liked. Most Americans 
accede to majority standards. They feel they should bring 
up their children pretty much as the neighbors do. British 
and Austrians differed markedly on this, stating more 
willingness to maintain child-raising standards of some 
difference from those of their neighbors. Americans were 
even more influenced by the opinions of others than Germans 
as to which movie to see, or which book to read (McClelland 
1961:19?)* As noted above, with Mead (Kluckhohn et_ al.196? 
663-6?0) and in Chapter 2, whereas the German's standard 
tends to be set by respected authorities, the American's 
tends to be set by the amorphous "others"— neighbors, 
acquaintances, fellow workers, the "peers"— De Tocqueville* 
majority.
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From personal observation as a teacher, this writer
doubts that the listed group activities are typical of
American teen-agers, though the leaders, a small minority,
do participate to considerable degree, as in Scouts, teams,
6bands. Likewise this writer questions that this type of 
participation has the great ameliorating effect attributed 
to it by McClelland. Rather, it is the other half of his 
explanation, the sheer pressures of numbers, of peers, 
applied to folk personalities (the normative American) 
vulnerable for approval, that pressures the conformity. In 
some situations this may indeed serve non-egocentric social 
ends as, for example, when the Scouts cooperatively clean up 
a littered river bed, or when individual Chamber of Commerce 
members depart from their competition long enough to provide 
the community with a dog pound, a beauty contest, or a 
polio fund-raising drive. Rut these activities are ancillary 
to each person's egocentric drive, his imperative need to 
carve out his own individual mark, attain a bettered status.
Japanese Comparisons: Mary Ellen Goodman's study
(1957:979-999) measured the values involved in occupational
The Junior College is admittedly (and hopefully) 
somewhat different from high school, since 60% are earning 
all or part of their keep, yet of the remaining 40/ (and 
even the busy 60/) scant few participate in group activities, 
other than occasional church activities. McClelland's sample 
of American high school students was.possibly skewed (elite 
group) and/or they were answering the questionnaire according 
to what was expected. Our culture also carries a socially 
cultivated piety of supporting the ideal of superimposing 
cooperative efforts, values, on top of the deep ego-centric 
drives. Smart respondents may be apt to give lip-service, 
for the institutionally urged goal of cooperation.
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aspirations of 1250 Japanese children in central Honshu.
These were compared with 3750 American children in the 
Northeastern United States. She analyzed their essays on 
"What I want to be when I grow up." Contrasts were signifi­
cant. In the upper grades the gap between Japanese and 
Americans steadily widened in that the Japanese children 
expressed more concern for others, the Americans progressively 
less concern (Goodman 1957;988)* In selection of future 
occupation the Americans chose for themselves (self-determina­
tion), whereas the Japanese choices were family-directed 
or oriented. The Japanese responses were strong for duty, 
obligation; the Americans stressed that aspect very little. 
With maturity the Japanese tended to subordinate personal 
desires, the Americans tended to focus on them all the 
more. Japanese aspirations were expressed within the frame­
work of being good team workers. The American expression 
was typified by the desire to be outstanding, to be a 
star in baseball big leagues, to be somebody like a President, 
to have grandiose schemes of running things.
These aspirations of urban northeast United States 
children were relatively parallel to those that the Bimrock 
authors found in the same (1950's) period for the rural, 
isolated Pantex children in New Mexico (Chapter 1). This 
indicated a fairly broad and congruent distribution of 
values even before the subsequent trend toward homogenization 
from television; so confirming a dominant trait-value.
Indi.vidua 1l_sm, "self-orientation, " was found to be much
7̂
higher for Americans than Japanese. American children 
were markedly more self-centered and egocentric than the 
Japanese (Goodman 1957:998). According to Goodman the 
modal American was enculturated to think of himself as 
a "private person" (autonomous), wherein private personal 
gain and advancement, ii lividual rights and freedom of 
self-expression and self-fulfillment were to be sought and 
exercised uninhibited by the demands or needs of others, 
whereas the Japanese was oriented to not think of self as 
autonomous. Japanese culture stressed uppermost duties 
and obligations rather than individual rights. With the 
onset of adulthood the Japanese individual's attention 
tended to be turned away from self toward family, community, 
and wider society. (Goodman 1957:997-998).
Between 19^7 and 1950 William Caudill and George de 
Vos (1956:1102-1126) studied 3^2 Japanese-American families, 
a sample of the 20,000 individuals who chose, under duress, 
to relocate themselves in Chicago during World War II. 
One-third of the sample were Issei, first generation immi­
grants, and two-thirds were Nisei, second-generation American 
born. They found that even in the highly acculturated Nisei 
certain differentials in cultural patterns still held, as 
reflected in their relatively greater success with employers 
and high regard by neighbors when compared to white Americans 
in general, and Negroes in particular. TAT and Rorschach 
tests were administered mainly for purposes unrelated to 
this paper, but the Japanese drive for achievement emerged
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outstandingly, even stronger than that of the normative 
American.
What was especially significant was that the context 
of achievement differed. Like Americans, the Japanese 
placed high value on deferred long range goals, including 
higher .education and professional success, hut to a high 
degree (by American standards) they held that a spotless 
reputation earned on the way was equally important. Likewise 
the way that money and power was used was important! its 
most desirable use was for the wider family and community. 
Powerful group social sanctions would be risked if the 
achievements were not so used. In contrast to Americans, 
where the method of attainment and ultimate use of money 
and prestige was considered a private, individual matter 
(as long as you did not get caught at something illegal), 
the Japanese value stressed the family and community responsi 
bility (see collaterality— group bonds— below). With the 
Japanese as with, to some extent, the Simrock Mormons 
(Chapter 1), the individual felt that he did not stand alone 
for support and therefore conversely he did not stand alone 
and free in making his choices of career and methods of 
achievement. It was always felt that the community was 
hovering close about, those "white-eyes" watching, weighing, 
criticizing, exerting a powerful force for constraint and 
inhibition. Hence the Japanese culture was more effective 
in enjoining group or community responsibility and duty, 
and thereby restricting individual freedom.
William Caudill and Henry Scarr (1962:53-91) inter­
viewed and tested Japanese children, comparing them with 
American children. They classified them under the headings 
of three types of orientation in values: Individual— ego­
centric, Collateral— strong orientation toward family and 
wider groups of orientation, and Lineal— orienting backward 
through perceived ancestors and forward through the children, 
a sense of family (or class or caste) continuity. In ranking 
the social relationships of Family and of Work Relations, 
they found that Americans put the greatest value on. Individual 
as #1, Collateral as #2, and Lineal as #3. The Japanese 
put Collateral as #1, Lineal as #2, and Individual as 0.
The point was stressed that these were dominant values 
of each society. Some deviates in each culture had a different 
sense of priorities, as when some modern adult Japanese 
set Individual as their #1 (thereby paying the psychic 
penalty of considerable internal guilt or anxiety for 
violating the norms in which they were socialized). Some 
minority-traditioned Americans such as the genteel Cavaliers 
of "old Virginny" would put Lineal as #1, as for them 
lineage, ancestral and extended "family", with its concomi­
tant values and high status furnished a bulwark to their 
most important set of values, a sense of elite pride.
American society has usually scorned such attitudes, as to
the majority they have appeared to reflect a distorted sense 
7of values.
7This is demonstrated over and over among students 
observed by the author /Footnote cont'd on following page./
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Caudill and Scarr (1962:90) made the further point 
that a shift in environmental conditions could favor those 
individuals holding minority values, elevating them to 
leadership and holding up their values for emulation.
This appears to be a possibility for Americans if the 
Ecology-minded "No Growl n" group should gradually win public 
approval and ascendency. But for such a group to become 
constituted as the new "tyranny of the majority"--the 
prevailing norm— changes in deep-seated values would be 
necessary (see Chapter 4).
Florence Kluckhohn (195°* 376-393) antedated and affirmed 
the findings of the above American-Japanese comparison in 
so far as dominant American values. She held that American 
core culture is in orientation individualistic, achieving. 
Status is determined by individual accomplishments and 
productivity (1950:382-83) and is future time oriented.
She stated that American society is not lineal, does not 
relate life toward ancestors. However in some subcultures, 
as for example in the Old South, or in a growth-bypassed 
town such as Warner's Jonesville (19^9) or Yankee City
/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ over a 15-year 
period whenever, in effect, lineality is brought up--pride 
of ancestry and family values handed down, as characteristic 
of the upper and upper-middle classes of the Old South.
With California students this invariably evokes strident 
condemnation as being un-American; each generation is to be 
on its oim. At least half the students never knew their 
grandparents or what they did in life. The Mormons are 
the Western deviate exception in cultivating a sense of 
lineality.
(There is allied a strong, built-in deprecation by 
the mainstream of Southern subculture.)
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^currently 1963). this normally weak subordinate value can 
have somewhat greater weight. Nor are American values 
Collateral in stress, as there are little or no alliances 
nor enduring bonds with kinsmen or wider family, as there 
are with the Japanese (thus her findings tie in with Caudill 
and Scarr above) (1962:53-91). The American orientation 
is individual, each person almost entirely "on his own," 
picking his way through the vicissitudes of life (as "pro­
grammed" by the culture). In analysis it appears that there 
may be a latent receptivity for collaterality that is uni­
versal. It could be a latent but potent American trait 
since Americans have functioned effectively in highly 
qollateral situations, though at unusual times and places, 
preferably under special duress, as when forced into crises 
where the situation is highly structured. An extreme case 
was the desperate induced group loyalty of the 1951 Marine 
Corps in North Korea, surrounded at the Choson Reservoir 
but passionately carrying their wounded back, fighting mile 
by mile. Another example was the one-season, continent- 
crossing Charlestoxm, Virginia Company, a volunteer'military- 
type overlander troop trekking to California in 1.8̂ 9 (Potter 
1962).8
^Typically, ex-Marines express ambivalence: great 
resentment at their egos having been crushed and free will 
restricted, with an equally great admiration for the esprit 
and a nostalgia about their lost sense of belonging. In 
combat, most would do more for each other than they ever 
would in subsequent individualistic life for any person, 
including nuclear.family loved ones.
Subordinate or minority-held values may be more central 
•to a minority group; e.g., those Negroes who are slum-dwelling, 
poorly socialized toward success. McClelland held that in 
the past, the dominant culture had a relatively low opinion 
of civil service jobs as being too limiting of daily freedom 
of action, while black people, confronted with a lack of 
other jobs, accepted the "low status" of a civil service 
job in order to gain security (196^:77). In evaluation: 
the blacks might feel deprived that they could not exercise 
their freedom to refuse such jobs. So it might not be so 
much a question of different values as the compromise of 
values in order to get ahead or compete.
Another, related view is that Negro lower class sub­
culture operates with a "value stretch"; that is, the 
minority also holds the dominant majority values, but 
stretches them to include an alternate set, and uses one 
or the other as the situation warrants (Robert Bell 1969:
223-^* citing Hyman Rodman 1963:209).
English Comparison: Devereux, et al. (1969:257-270)
compared 700 sixth graders in Surrey, England, with 900 
comparable pupils in Onondaga, New York (half the American 
sample came from public, half from parochial schools). As 
the English sample was all native-born, the authors culled 
the New York sample likewise; to eliminate subcultural 
variation, they removed Negroes also. They administered 
a 30-item questionnaire concerning parent-practices as 
seen from the child's viewpoint. There was no direct or
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participant observation such as an anthropologist would 
find minimal to validate or check the questionnaire. None­
theless, the authors thought the results valid since they 
converged with another study where there was direct obser­
vation of parent-child relationships. They found that 
the American child was encouraged to be independent and 
vocal in. his views, was more vocal, outgoing, flexible, 
less respectful of authority. In comparison, the English 
pupils--in some ways cultural cousins--were more inhibited 
in behavior, quieter, harder studying and more stoic.
Another study by Maurice L. Farber (in McClelland 
1955s323-330), compared by questionnaire the views of 32 
insurance clerks in England with those of 81 Americans, 
on the ranking of desirable qualities to be cultivated in 
their children. Parber found that in Britain, repression 
of aggression was important, but not in America (so validating 
Rimrock, Chapter 1). For the Britons, the concept of 
getting along with others was not cited, while for the 
Americans it was strongly noted (therefore differing from 
Rimrock's Pantexes, and more like its Mormons). This seemed 
to relate to the American responses which stressed love- 
getting and giving--possibly a modern development?
These findings tended to reinforce Inkeles' findings 
(above) (Kluckhohn & Murray 1964-: 577-592.) that in comparison 
with the Russians, Americans were greatly fearful of being 
isolated from the group; that they had need for approval 
and recognition, need to be liked. Another finding was
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that the American responses stressed adjustment to other 
children whereas the British adjustment was toward adults 
(McClelland 1955•• 327). Thus these findings supported Mead's 
and McClelland's views that standards tend to be set by- 
peers; approval must come from peers, more so than in Germany 
or England. And, of course, much more so than Japan, where 
peers and family standards tended to be one anyhow.
Adamson Hoebel and Francis Hsu are, in effect, current 
pioneers among recognized contemporary major anthropologists 
in insisting that the study of the American character; is a 
desirable and potentially fruitful field. In his overview 
of anthropological studies of the American ethnic ("national 
character"), Adamson Hoebel (1967:1-?) stated that since 
Margaret Mead's (1965 /1942/) war-inspired work on the Americans, 
there has been a great reluctance on the part of American 
anthropologists to tackle their own American culture.
This has occurred despite the great success and criti­
cally-acclaimed validity of Ruth Benedict's 1946 non-partici- 
pant-observer analysis of Japanese culture, The Chrysanthemum 
SliSL Ml®. ^  a complex culture of 100 million people
could be analyzed and captured in a study, by a non-participant 
observer, why could not one of 150.million (now 200 million)-—  
the American? One objection was that American culture was 
held to be not as homogeneous as Japan's. However, Clyde 
Kluckhohn has been cited in Chapter 2 of this study (1958a*
149) as saying that in his judgment, based on a.lifetime of 
study, the American culture is as regular and pervasive in
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its dominant value-traits as that of any other major country. 
And one of the by-products of this paper in examining autonomy 
and achievement and considering the evaluations of many 
anthropologists and sociologists, is the evidence of regularity 
of these traits and their negative corollaries.
Hoebel (1967:1-7) lauds Jules Henry and Francis L, K.
Hsu as the only two scholars to tackle the American ethnic 
in this last decade. One, Henry, offered a very subjective, 
angry, reform tract; the other, Hsu, presented an objective 
comparison of his traditional Chinese culture with his adopted 
American culture.
/
Francis L. K. Hsu, a Chinese-American anthropologist 
of Northwestern University, a specialist on national charac­
ter, modal personality types, and core values, has been 
drawing American-Chinese comparisons over a period of twenty 
years, seeking to characterize and explain the American 
character (1951a » 1951^* 1953* 1961, 1963). He cited ego- 
centricity (completely or dominantly self-oriented deter­
mination) as being a core trait that generates numerous
corrosive social and personal traits (1951a•2^3-250 and 19516):|
57-66). Compared with traditional Chinese values, the American 
norm of choosing a mate for oneself, for love (which Hsu 
regarded as chance), is a manifestation of ego-centric 
individualism that tends to produce incompatibility, broken 
homes and unstable background for socializing the next 
generation. Traditional Chinese deference to family wishes 
and social suasion, on the other hand, made marriage and its
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(constricted) sex activity socially constructive. With 
the Chinese culture's stress on loyalty to the lineage and 
the larger, extended family, generational gap conflicts were 
minimized and the young people grew up fitting the social 
mold without the destructiveness of American (and, in his 
opinion, pan-Western, Euro-American) individualism. Hsu 
advanced his view that the extremely high American crime 
rate was the product of emotion— runaway self-gratification 
(195dbs62-65)? He stated further that this crime level was 
the product of intense pressure for individual achievement, 
which has run amuck, lacking the balancing influence of 
family constraints and loyalties (1963:202). Compare also the 
Japanese (above) (Goodman 1957:998, Caudill & Scarr 1962s 
53-91).
Hsu held that the dominant element in American kinship 
values was "self reliance" (autonomousness). Each person 
functioned as an independent unit and was enculturated to 
think foremost of his own rights, pleasures, privacy, status, 
advancement, and to try to achieve these wants through self-
gHsu's comparisons are based, of course, on the patterns 
of pre-Communist China prior to 19^8. Such society no longer 
exists on the mainland. Although diluted, these values still 
persist, and are still significant, in American-Chinese, where 
overall, despite the publicity of San Francisco's Chinatown 
gangsterism, the delinquency and crime rate is only a small 
fraction of that of the American mainstream. However, various 
other students of Chinese and Chinese-American culture have 
noted that this system also involved much internal conflict 
and stress, and occasional suicide, although the American 
seems to involve much more internal and external stress, 
pyramided.
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reliance. Furthermore, an American was culturally compelled 
to so strive since he had no set niche or longrun family 
(no lineality sense) or larger extended family and lineage 
ties of reference. Each person had to carve out his own 
destiny. Since the parental family could afford no protection 
for the child as an adult, the child sought the security of 
his peer group. The peer groups of his school, playground 
and job would be his mentors, judges, and measures of success. ■ 
By contrast, in traditional China the children were oriented 
vertically toward their elders, rather than peers (1963:202).
In evaluation: Hsu has held very strongly to this theme
over twenty years of writing and studying the American 
character. In it he independently affirms Mead (Kluckhohn, 
et al 1967:663-670), Inkeles (Kluckhohn & Murray 196^:557- 
592), McClelland (196^:65-7^), and Devereux (1969:257-270) 
on peer-power and the paradox of the American concept of 
free-willed independence actually circumscribed by the non- 
institutional, irrational, ineluctable peer-power (democratic 
power?) or "tyranny of the majority."10
Success-Failure Conformity: Likewise, Ksu affirmed the
view that the stress on independent achievement continually 
spurs the self-reliant man to outdo his peers, to seek 
visible symbols of relative achievement. An example would 
be changing homes frequently In an "upgrading" progression,
10A "democratic" folk opinion, but actually suppressive 
of minority or independent values.
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moving to ever better homes outward in the suburban ring, 
or changing friends to match, or shifting from club to club 
(as from the Elks to the Country Club, or from the smaller 
college to the greater university, or from the four-square 
Fundamentalists to the Episcopalians) (Hsu 1963:213). A 
deep psychic injury restxts when the striver has attained 
successive higher levels but then "stagnates"--hits his 
ceiling on a job plateau, or otherwise falls short of his 
ultimate status. This shortfall tends to be interpreted as 
a shortcoming, a failure, even though the modal American 
has, in fact, heretofore climbed a fair piece upwards in 
his job status and real wages from where he started— his 
father's level. This was largely made possible by the 
constant population and geographic expansion and exploitation 
of new resources, catalyzed by technological and managerial 
transformations.
Said status striving and resultant apprehension of 
mediocrity, with increasing sense of failure, tends ultimately 
to block much of the striver's avenues of satisfaction, 
sociability, status, and security. The self-reliant manj
has no retreat— not back to where he started from, nor back 
to his family of origin (it no longer exists) (Hsu 1963:
228), Feelings of inferiority, low self-worth, and frustration 
develop all along the way, from grade school to middle age,^
^ I n  De Tocqueville's assessment, "in a democracy" 
most men will end up being frustrated since only a few can 
win the choicest plums. He assumed that the American democracy 
would serve as the prototype for all. In that, he may have been 
the prisoner of insufficient data— of European, Western civili­
zation blinders.
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and worsen with old age (see below). These phrases parallel
those of Goldschmidt and Clyde Kluckhohn (above, 1955sl209-
1217, and 1967:663-670, respectively). Hsu holds that
the more a culture stresses self-reliance, the 
more it will generate fear of inferiority... 
and the more it will compel him to conformity 
(1963:217)
So he comes to agreement with Ihkeles (Kluckhohn &
Murray 196^:557-592), Devereux (1969:257-270), with the 
historic observations of De Tocqueville and Martineau 
(Chapter 2) in the seeming non-sequitur (from Western philo­
sophic rationale) that this most individualistic culture, 
in self-determination, operates to prescribe restricted 
patterns of performance and values on its members. In Hsu's 
Reasoning it is not so odd, this constriction or channeling 
of the free will, by peer power, but is a cause and effect.
Intra-Cultural
Oldsters: Hoebel (1967:1-7) erred in listing only
Jules Henry and Hsu as interpreters of the American culture 
during the last decade. Two contemporary northern California 
anthropologists, Margaret Clark and Barbara Gallatin Ander­
son, in their study of Culture and Aging (1967), have probed 
deeply into the post-65, or terminating, stage of the life 
cycle. Most Americans prefer to close their minds to this 
aging segment of society and its characteristics, Clark 
and Anderson's method was largely that of in-depth, long­
term interviewing (buttressed by questionnaires), and thorough 
acquaintance with their subjects and with the milieu, in 
this case representative aged from both mainstream and
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minority subcultures in San Francisco (most of the sample 
were born and raised elsewhere). These authors affirmed 
the basic values of autonomy and achievement as set forth 
from the many approaches mentioned above. And they found 
their aging subject sample subscribing to these values to 
which they had been socialized from childhood. They held 
that an American is expected to:
,o.be independent, responsible, and self-respecting,
and thereby to be worthy of respect in one's own
right (1967:428).
As stated in connection with Hsu's views, in the 
development of a typical American career, frustration and 
feelings of failure may become overpowering by middle age. 
Finally in old age and after forced retirement these feelings 
tend to become an obsession. The authors hold that in America 
success-achievement has a "sacred character", that most of 
the oldsters can no longer "produce" (that is, they are not 
allowed to produce). Retirement ends the principal prop 
to their self-esteem. It erodes their self-image, their 
self-value. They perceive themselves as finished, of little 
value in terms of their social worth. Curiously, or 
logically, the peer value standard does not shift with cir­
cumstances! it is still the lifetime value of producing, 
of being a success. One aspect of the achievement imperative 
is the need to feel superior to other people. It is so 
enculturated that the authors claim that American mental 
health demands it. This too is a product of autonomous 
achievement; one must achieve to have self-worth. Remove
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this ego-support and the personality edifice has a tendency 
to come apart and deteriorate (Clark &.;Anderson 1967:182).
The other half of these twin imperatives, culturally 
induced need for independence, is equally difficult for the 
aged to continue to fulfill. All their lives they have 
been taught and expected to pilot their own lives and 
support themselves (see Pantexes, Chapter 1) and now.in 
the socially-enforced twilight of diminished self support—  
even a healthy person is often forced to yield up his job 
at age 65— these socially degraded people find it harder
and harder to live up to their norm of self-respect. As
/
their money fails, circumstances, in many cases, force them
to turn reluctantly to social agencies for help. Most of
the "mainstream"people interviewed, those of the dominant
middle-class-values majority, abhorred this prospect, feeling
such "charity" to be a final confession of defeat. For
their values, unchanging through life, included
...the ability to keep on managing oneself, 
to go it alone, to reaffirm that one is still a 
self-governing adult (Clark & Anderson 1967 080).
The authors noted that the personality effects of accumulating
years arise only partially, or not at all, from biological
factors; that the culture powerfully prefigures the effects
of aging on personality and even on health. For the culture
decrees that the great majority of aged people can never
again achieve' in the real world, the competitive, wage-earning
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12world; they can no longer maintain their economic independence; 
they tend to become "sick", eventually developing real 
physical Illness. So this apparent biological problem 
actually stems from mainstream American cultural values,, In 
comparison, the subject Latin-Americans and Chinese-Americans, 
to the degree that they were not fully acculturated, tended 
to keep their health and self-respect. A Chinese or Latino 
deemed it right and proper for his middle-aged children to 
support him with no lessening of his self respect, whereas 
the mainstream American detested this "admission of failure"
— "never be dependent on your children— or anyone else"
(Clark & Anderson 1967:177-180, 222, 381, 390).
As the aged were unable to measure up to these tests 
of manhood, of self-worth, they would increasingly develop 
mental and physical problems. "Death is preferable to 
becoming a burden" was frequently voiced. Institutionalization 
for a modal American, who has normatively been anti-insti­
tutional all his life, is slow death— as the last vestiges 
of one's autonomy, independence, is torn away. In an equali- 
tarian ward of a nursing home or County Hospital, it is 
very difficult to feel superior to anybody. Women lived 
somewhat longer than men, since their achievement and inde­
pendence drive had not been inculcated personally to the 
same degree. In evaluations as women are now being stimulated
12' To the "Senior Citizen", even programs of card-playing, 
folk dancing, and making unsalable handicrafts seem as 
fuseless" (nonproductive) as they would to Americans still 
in the mainstream if this were their main activity.
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to compete for higher achievement on a ladder equal with 
men, we can expect to approach equal problems of failing 
self reliance and ego-erosion thirty to fifty years from 
now. In effect, the aged now have no real place in the 
American value system based on autonomous achievement. For 
their own self-image and mental health, the aged need to 
reconstitute themselves as a new subculture with value 
standards significantly different from those of the dominant 
culture.
Another dismal product of autonomous living, with its 
associated geographic and social mobility and the resultant 
condition of having few friends and scant or rejected family, 
was that most aged people had lost all or nearly all of their 
social alliances. The initial reason was that most, as 
normative Americans, throughout life never had many endearing, 
enduring relationships, family and friends. Compounding 
this was that early death, or retreat, of those relation­
ships one had had, combined with the act of retirement, cut 
one off from the "actives"— those still gainfully employed, 
who shun and abhor the physical evidence of what lies in 
wait for them, too. Also, the authors found a tendency for 
these typically defeated, inadequate-feeling aged, who loathed 
the physical and social evidences of their "failure," to 
avoid each other. All told, these factors produced mental 
changes that worsened any personal relationships.1-̂
1-̂A few escape this by being deemed not aged, by taking 
high office at 65 as did President Eisenhower, or being an 
independent savant like Hyman Rickover and Albert Einstein, 
or a recognized independent productive artist as cellist 
Pablo Casals, age 9^» conductor /footnote cont'd following page/
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The average American past 65 years of age Is deprived, 
anxious, depressed, idle, and unhappy. In part, this results 
from the cultural patterns which stress autonomy and achieve­
ment (and which favor youth and beauty, fragile family ties 
and anti-authority), and in part from the catastrophic inter­
action of the destructive effects of being deemed old— un­
wanted, non-productive. This is in contrast to an aged 
Korean or aged member of other traditional East Asian cultures, 
where such Individuals are accorded an honorific status.
They usually retain control of the family wealth, and continue 
in respected dally social relations with others of kin and 
community who are of different generations (Clark & Anderson
1967.13).
The reader may suspect that Clark and Anderson have 
magnified the negative aspects of the aged's situation, 
that they shared the (alleged) bias typical of psychological 
anthropologists— "wherever he looks he finds pathology,"
In fairness, it should be noted that these authors did 
find that a small minority of their senior subjects were 
making a reasonably good adjustment to their social securityI
years. One category consisted of those who were able to 
continue along their lifetime "independent" (self-supporting) 
ways, as for example the self-employed watchmaker or
/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ Leopold Stowkowski, 
age 89, or Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas, the 
Pope, and most U.S. Senators. But most people cannot do 
this. Even those economically well off and healthy feel 
the purposelessness and alienation faced by the gabby, 
vigorous, purposeless, unwanted hero of the movie Kotch.
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carpenter. These, In effect, were able to continue comfor­
tably with their value system past the age of 65. A different 
sort of category were those who had always been deprived of 
significant achievement and/or of minimal affective ties; 
the dislocations of age were minimal for the spinster or 
bachelor who had long ago become resigned and adjusted to 
lone living and for those persons who had also learned 
throughout life to accept relatively low achievement levels 
and standards of consumption.
In these latter cases the lifetime relative deprivation
of either family ties and/or notable achievement and its
economic rewards had rendered these types of people marginal
in terms of the dominant culture. But when they passed 65
their heretofore deviate or substandard patterns suddenly
became those patterns most suitable for survival, because
such deprivation became the majority norm. Therefore these
longtime-disadvantaged people experienced only a lesser
"come-down" of deprivation and so suffered the least injury
to their mental health. Other minorities who also deviated
from the dominant autonomous achievement norms made excellent
adjustments— those of Oriental or Latin cultures who had
lived and continued to live in some measure avowedly rein-
lAforced and supported by family and collective ties.
Cases have occurred of lonely old women of the mainstream 
culture putting ads in'the paper for people to phone them. 
Organizations of volunteers have tried to perform such 
contacts. The Mormons have a regular function of calling 
isolated souls (and also "jack", fallen-away brethren). No 
Mormon is supposed to be isolated, or ever "lost" for good.
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This would tend to Indicate that two of the values that have 
contributed mightily to the American reshaping of a con­
tinent and leading of the world in wealth and technology, 
were two of the most undesirable values to carry on into 
normative (typical) retirement (no useful function or place). 
These findings could even indicate that in the end true 
"independence" might— though not necessarily— derive from a 
lifetime of non-achievement, non-autonomousness.
Jules Henry, through his work in geriatric hospitals 
(1963), tended to confirm the findings of Clark and Anderson 
(1967:182, 380)* He held that humans in America tend toward 
obsolescence all through life, which begets great insecurity. 
(This paralleled Margaret Mead's affirmation of American 
built-in human obsolescence (1967:663-67) though she asserted 
that the remedy was to keep changing toward youth values). 
Henry observed in the geriatric hospitals "the bitter fruits" 
of the culture being fought out to the end, as when two old 
ladies in their fight for autonomousness quarreled over the 
use of the room, fighting for privacy (or dominance?) (Henry 
1963:9-29, 450-1). In evaluation: Perhaps in another culture
where privacy (autonomousness) is not considered as high a 
"good", they might still fight— if they were very poor, like 
low-caste Indians who might fight with their families or 
others for food, or if they were feeling a loss of position, 
as in modern urban Japan, whose people struggle increasingly 
for attention and a role of relevance.
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Like most Americans, who feel that man should be in
control of his destiny, Henry apparently felt that there
should be a good ending to all stories, and that human
relation problems are, or should be, solvable. This aspect
of his values makes Henry very American. Henry observed in
the hospital that:
...culture outlasts body and mind...body barely 
alive...but the mind of an American upper-middle 
class woman is concerned with appearance and 
status, and her capacity to hate and hurt, as 
determined by the channels of her culture (1963:^73)•
In evaluation: This reflection in the aged of personal
conflicts aged cultural value patterns is possibly just 
human, although it does illustrate the persistence of value­
laden behavior to the end. Henry found, in the end, no 
love. Is this lovelessness in old age an American trait- 
value, too?
Summary
In this chapter the findings of many anthropologists 
and sociologists have been marshalled as to the nature, extent, 
and significance of the value-traits autonomy-achlevement 
in the (dominant) American ethnic pattern. Some, like 
Inkeles, based their findings on a battery of methods—  
Horschach, TAT tests, life history. Others, such as Gold­
schmidt and Mead, based their findings on a lifetime spent 
as participant-observers of the American culture with compara­
tive studies with other cultures— their methodology was 
similar to Ruth Benedict's analysis of the Japanese culture 
(19^6).
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Although Benedict used interviews and studies, she was 
not a participant observer. Significantly, the findings of 
those who used ethnographic observation and those who used 
the battery of tests and observations were in general agree­
ment. Agreement in findings as to the nature and extent of 
the autonomousness— independent, own self-oriented, decision 
making— and achievement— the awesome lemming-like drive for 
autonomously attaining high job status regardless of ties 
of family, friends, home base— occurred so regularly as to 
be somewhat repetitious. There was consistent explication 
as to the gap between the American culture's conscious 
advocacy of cooperation, veneration of the aged, strong belief 
in the family ties, and the actual contravening reality of 
dominant egocentricity.
For soundness of support, a dozen or more authorities 
of repute in anthropology-sociology, as well as lesser known 
researchers, were discussed. There was no serious disagreement 
among the experts on the essential, central trends toward 
more autonomy and achievement, manifest over the 200 or more 
years that the American ethnic and its cultural patterns 
have been in existence.
■ There was, however, some disagreement as to the nature 
of this self-reliance, and the nature of the socialization 
for adulthood, as between classic Rimrock development of 
youth's competency and Jules Henry's modern findings of youth 
dependency. The studies also revealed a claimed weakness 
in internalized self-discipline, as seen both by Kluckhohn
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and in the Danish comparison. These more controversial, 
or unreconciled, items may in part represent shifts over 
time, and shifts from the rural frontier to the urban setting; 
in part they may represent intrinsic paradoxes and self- 
delusional myths which the radical intellectuals rediscover 
each generation and use jo dub America a "sick society."
The following chapter will discuss how these critics' efforts 
may in time serve as catalysts for socially self-directed 
changes in values, to reconcile some of these discontinuities 
and apparently inappropriate sets of values.
Comparison with various other cultures— British, German,
IJapanese, Chinese--highlighted differences in values held 
by the Americans, as being more independent and seemingly 
individually outspoken and "free-thinking." However, the 
purely individual striving was seen as masking the unconscious 
workings of an imperative social control. Most members of 
the dominant "mainstreamers" had been socialized to strive 
along socially dictated patterns of conformity. The con­
comitant ego-sapping by-products of the imperative for 
autonomous achievement, in striving to "be better" (than
i
someone else), winning higher status, that De Tocqueville 
noted already in the 1830's, were found also by the modern 
authorities. Whether studied in comparison with Chinese, 
Russian, English, or other cultures, these negative reciprocals 
stood out: the conformity (above), isolation and loneliness,
frustration, especially in middle years and most strongly 
past 65 years of age, and need for approval and recognition
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at all ages coupled with the deep-seated fear of too close
1<involvement with others. J
^Given all these factors, most of which drive people 
apart rather than together, it's a wonder that any American 
marriages last a lifetime. Even though as would be expected 
the American culture has the highest break-up rate of any 
Western nation, it is a tribute to other values— loyalty, 
traditional ideals, minority religions— that the majority of 
marriages still hold (70$ of first, 50$ of second marriages).
As the reader knows, there is no basic hominid guarantee 
of such holding, since in some cultures, notably the Hopi, 
the modal situation is no marriage lasting for a lifetime.
In the Hopi society, however, the extensive collaterality 
takes up much of the affective need.
The Mormons hold that the selection of a mate— for 
eternity— is the most important choice in life; that no 
career achievement can be valued in comparison to the loss 
of family. The Mormons have doubled their American membership 
these past 20 years— only half of which growth was due to 
excess of births over deaths.
Chapter ^
THE MORE TENTATIVE APPRAISALS
Purpose
In Chapter 3 were set forth those basic characteristics 
and interwoven products of the autonomy and achievement 
trait-values that are widely affirmed and are largely agreed 
upon by scholars. At the present writing these seem to be 
accepted by the serious students of American culture, and, 
in this writer's view, are acceptable as relatively sound 
judgments even though at some points they are at variance 
with the common American self-image. Hence, the first 
three chapters of this paper brings together data and sources 
usable in revisionist efforts to clarify the American view 
of ourselves— self-knowledge.
In this chapter the paper seeks to go further and explore 
the uncertain. The first part presents an overlapping 
collection— in effect, a web, of interpretations and inferences 
about these traits, in contemporary American society. These 
trait-values' modern manifestations, and possible shifts 
or transformations over time, and the resultant effects, are 
set forth as worthy of note because the various writers' 
interpretations of these phenomena seem to have, at least in 
part, some truth to them (though they are not proven, nor are 
they disproven).
These interpretations are offered for thought, as 
tentative clues and Insight into the complexity of a national
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culture— particularly the paradoxes of the American culture. 
These interpretations are also, of course, the product of 
the diverse individuality, the selective biases, of the 
different observers.
The second part of the chapter offers a final cautious 
assessment of "where we seem to be" lately relative to these 
traits, especially in reference to the momentous value- 
practices changes that have occurred since 1965* What now 
are the salient cultural values related to autonomy and 
achievement, and in what possible direction (or directions) 
is the trend?
Inferences Problematic; Time Shifts in Values
Was old time "rugged individualism" sabotaged by modem 
urban industrial society? Du Bois (1955s1236) and Henry 
(1966:105-6) followed the logic that this prized rugged 
individualism must have been eroded and weakened progres­
sively since the advent of industrialization, about De 
Tocqueville's time, 1831. This gradual industrialization 
of American society during the 19th century was accompanied 
by a shift in occupation from the "independent" self-employed 
frontiersman and farmer to the work-dependent industrial 
employee, and from isolated farmstead life to close-in 
urban living. Therefore, they held that the transformation 
of the average American type into a subordinated, somewhat 
regimented employee was a transformation to normative 
conformist. However, there is much evidence to indicate 
that the conformist trait was endemic from the beginning,
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as touched upon in Chapter 2.
The clue perhaps lies in the natural tendency of the 
observers of colonial or frontier child-raising to emphasize 
the obvious, the strikingly American, traits: Independence,
precocity, rejection of authority and the seeming sturdy 
competence of the children. Yet the observers may have missed, 
or given insufficient weight to, the less patent but in effect 
repressive or "neurosis"-inducing manner of child-sociali- 
zation by parents and peers.
Noting examples of "survival" of earliest American ways, 
researchers pointed to Rimrock's (Chapter 1) weaning and toilet 
training as being forced at the earliest possible time, 
far ahead of the world average (Whiting & Child 1953:7^t 
and in Barnouw 1963:12^-5). While the foreign observers 
of the 1800's did not specifIcally mention this "diaper 
anthropology," they did note great parental disgust at 
soilage and heavy stress on cleanliness (Murphey 1965:
151). These latter values have a familiar ring, for Americans 
do have a great— "neurotic", from a world tfiew— loathing of 
dirt, especially fecal dirt. Cleanliness is such a com­
pulsion in the American culture that other peoples are
often judged civilized or not by the standard of cleanliness
1alone, and "dirty" is the most common pejorative term.
^The reader can recognize "dirty"'s extensive cultural 
role: "dirty S.O.B.", "to play dirty", "dirty jokes" (sexually 
prurient episodes). In the Oakland police usage, any suspect 
or wanted person is "dirty." Or the phrase that became household 
from its popularization on a television program--"dirty old man" 
— the pejorative of dirt, and of age (both deeply negative values 
in the culture). Or, in America "Godliness is next to cleanli­
ness."
7**
Authorities state that both in Rimrock and modern urban 
America oral indulgence is much more restricted than in 
most other societies: the nursing period is short, the
anal training is more severe than all other societies 
studied except the Tanala and Chagga (Barnouw 1963*350-351» 
and Whiting & Child 1953*7*0-.
Therefore possibly the Americans developed a pattern 
of child raising that produced seemingly self-reliant, 
self-sufficient, precociously mature children who, at the 
same time, had been imprinted with an anxious, compulsive
drive for success, a concomitant fear of failure, and an
/
allied deep-seated insecurity that left them constantly 
craving approval and recognition. Both sets of traits 
would tend to be interlocked in the same persons, though 
perhaps in varying proportions. Frontier farming conditions 
did equip the person with practical skills to cope with his 
environment and so may have immediately masked these insecurity- 
motivated needs, which then emerged in adulthood. For these 
widespread pressures for conformity were noted long before 
the shift to urban living and wage-employment (See ChapterI
2.) However, the said urbanization/industrialization shift 
seemed to concerned critics to be also a shift in values, 
since the locale change made both the drive for success and 
the autonomy-achievement related insecurities more apparent. 
Factors such as the chanciness of job security and self 
support, the vulnerability to the effects of "boom-and-bust" 
economics, the relative individual success and failure roles, 
were played out in the urbanized theater with large proximal
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audiences. When so grouped together, people's vulnerabilities
were more apparent.
Thus it may be that the esteemed American folk trait
of "rugged individualism" would be a more apt designation
for the thematic guiding principle and value of autonomous
self-orientation, and its fulfillment in carving out an
autonomous enterprising career successfully, as, say, with
an Andrew Carnegie. It is less valid in reality in its
representation of a theoretical, idealized concept of a man
of independent integrity, the rare non-approval-seeking
2Independent-minded individualist, like Edmund Ross. Our 
folk lore, our national myths, put high lipservice value on 
the latter qualities, but our true deeper values usually 
icrked to consign such an individualist to status failure 
and nonemulation by the members of his society. There is 
a tendency to judge such ambivalence of values to be the 
product of modernity, but it appears to have always been 
there— this massive ground-swell unconsciously socialized
pEdmund Ross's (1826-190?) career is an embodiment of 
an ideal, but not the dominant norm. Elected as an abolition­
ist type radical Republican Senator from Kansas, he refused 
in 1868, on the principle of justice and for the good of 
the presidency, to accede to the overwhelming public and 
peer (nearly 2/3 of his fellow Senators) pressure to impeach 
President Andrew Johnson. For voting his conscience and 
independent judgment, he was outrageously vilified and 
ostracized and denied election the rest of his life. For 
20 years thereafter he worked mostly as a newspaper printer, 
usually bucking the dominant norm--and usually losing.
Earl Warren's career had significant elements closer 
to the norm of conformity to the popular will. Despite his 
later liberalism and seeming independence as Chief Justice of 
the United States (1953-1968), in 19̂ +2 as California Attorney 
General he strongly supported the widely popular Californian 
demand for relocation of the Japanese-Americans. He was 
elected Governor the next year.
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in the Infant and childhood need to conform to achieve 
approval and security, versus the ostensible American ideal 
of (seemingly) being a truly independent man. Some such 
approval need is probably as old as man, a "social animal," 
but its power appears to be at noteworthy variance with 
conventional American mythology.
Pursuing the problem a step further, have the shifts 
in socialization patterns of the American child tended to 
make him and his adult self more vulnerable to the power of 
his peers? Has the erstwhile training for independence—  
taking care of oneself— been delayed to post-adolescence 
by indulgent and protective child-raising? Is there discon­
tinuity in the raising of American children for the life 
with which they must cope?— and succeed?
Lipset (Chapter 2) quoted the 19th century observers,
Martineau, Berger, Wecter (1963:168-177. 119) to the effect
that not only were the American children making their decisions
apart from their parents, but they were trained for activity
and self-dependence, they were equipped to strike out on
3their own, to make their living "on their own hook."
Some of the observers, like Anthony Trollope in i860 and 
James Muirhead in 1900, felt that the child's desires and 
views were unduly indulged, that they were never punished, 
that America was a child-centered culture (Lipset 1963:120),
From New England fishermen, "on your own hook" was to 
fish self-employed, independent— an early ideal.
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The Rimrock authors (Chapter 1) judged that the Pantex 
children were being trained for independent coping with 
life. American history witnessed repeatedly the pattern 
of sons and daughters growing up, cutting the family 
connection, and moving westward on their own. The relative 
success and survival of -hese offspring must have indicated 
that they had good socialization to get along on their own, 
for the tendency was for one to get scant help from one's 
neighbors (Chapter 2).
But in modern times this "paddle-your-own-canoe" type 
of independence has been called into question. In the 
Farber study (McClelland 1955023-330), the values British 
parents preferred their children to learn in contrast to the 
American preferences Indicated that the British (said they) 
put greater stress on self-reliance, whereas the Americans 
stressed instead getting along, smoothly functioning with the 
group, getting and giving love. This would be at considerable 
variance with the stated and observed ovex-t values of the 
Rimrock Pantexes, and would be more akin to the Mormons.
In evaluation: such study carries the suspicion of methodo-I'
logical flaw— in accepting what people say as fact, rather 
than combining the questionnaire with anthropological studies 
of relationships. Yet the findings may indicate a shift 
toward recognizing the power of the peers and more realis­
tically discounting the shibboleth of independence. Perhaps 
independence has simply been subordinated to concern over 
"getting along."
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Kandel and. Lesser's (1969:3^8-358) study used question­
naires to compare the student-stated values of American 
and Danish high school students (232? American vs. 1552 
Danish). There were no validating field observations. They 
found that the reported typical Danish parent-child rela­
tionship was more like the impression of American families 
recorded in the 19th century by De Tooqueville and others, 
that the modern Danish family relations were the more demo­
cratic and equalitarian. In contrast, the American students 
reported constrained, autocratic, parent-controlled rela­
tionships (surprisingly!). The authors suggested that the 
American adolescents operated under external constrains 
whereas the Danes had internalized norms instilled through 
the greater infant discipline practiced by the Danes com­
pared to the permissiveness of the American infant disci­
pline. They reported that the average American adolescent 
was much more dissatisfied than his Danish counterpart with 
the amount of curtailment of his independence:(he was, of 
course, still dependent on the parents for economic support),
In conclusion! This is a hard study to fit in. The 
findings seem to conflict with those of most authorities, 
who state that peer power was and is of paramount impor­
tance in American society, especially for developing adoles­
cents. Possibly the Danish comparison could be partly right. 
In America, attempted parental control during the schooling 
period, extended to age 18, does play a longer role than in 
Denmark and most other countries where school is on the
79
average terminated two or more years earlier. There have 
been sizable changes, diminutions, in responsibility put 
upon American children since the Rimrock type of life, 
including the lengthening of economic dependence since most 
American high school students lack significant chores or 
role in the earning of the family income. Along with higher 
and higher education, interrelated with the shift to urban 
living, has come prolonged economic dependence.
Another interpretation is that it could be the rivalry, 
the tension, between peer power, egging the juveniles on 
to "independence" and defiance of parental control, versus 
the continued concern and control efforts of the parents, 
that caused the respondents to pain a picture of parental 
despotism. Perhaps the respondents had no real comparison 
of what really authoritarian parents would be like--see 
Jules Henry below (1963s260-261). However obliquely, these 
authors may have stumbled onto something possibly valid, 
though lacking supporting and clarifying evidence. Kluck- 
hohn, in his earlier, less mature criticisms of American 
society (19^1:175) held that, "The United States is, then, 
weak in internalized social control from the educative 
process." But he did not clarify what he meant. More 
telling evidence of such lack of internal controls might be 
the performance of the American prisoners of war in Korea, 
discussed later.
The Danish comparison touched only part of the depths 
of the adolescent value conflicts, which Hsu cited as highly
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significant (1963s200-201). Therein he portrayed, the 
inconsistency, the discontinuity of the American 
child-raising process wherein the child is encouraged to 
he autonomous, independent, to think for himself and he 
self-reliant, while perversely (from Hsu's view) parents 
sought to shield the child from the real world of adults, 
of adversity, competition, cruelty, evil, sickness and 
death. The Americans sought to impart to their children 
an idealized picture of the world, man, and American society. 
Hsu held that such raising was defective in that it delayed 
maturity and produced great stress due to gaps in sociali­
zation. He held that this shielded child raising resulted 
in lack of adequate experience training, lack of the temper­
ing needed to cope with life. He contended that it could 
give rise to serious disillusionment with the real world 
when the post-18-year-old person must suddenly seek success 
in a highly competitive, autonomous role in a society 
demanding competent, unremitting performance.
A generation ago, in 1938, Buth Benedict (in Kluckhohn 
& Murray, 1967:522-531) characterized the American culturei
as one of great discontinuity between what children were 
allowed and socialized to do, and the great weight of full 
competition with adults they had suddenly to cope with upon, 
adulthood. In America, the stress attending the onset of
However, other critics fault the school system for 
being too competitive, producing failures at an early age; 
a conflict of values. Recent Education Ph.D. products seem 
to seek to minimize the competitive value as destructive. 
/Footnote cont'd on following page/
adulthood is great. The psychic ""breakage" is thus great, 
developing in those who cannot adequately cope with society's 
demands, or who flounder through life deemed arrested in 
some pre-adult stage of "perpetual adolescence". Most 
cultures enculturate the young in a consistent, gradual 
system of developing greater and greater responsibilities, 
awareness and capacities to cope.
As noted, the shift from Rimrock-type living to modern 
urban has accelerated these discontinuities. However, 
this factor need not be totally decisive as witnessed with 
the partly-assimilated California Chinese and Japanese and 
the 95% mainstream-cultured Mormons. All three groups are 
still relatively successful in their raising of children 
in such a manner as to develop patterns of responsibility; 
they all experience lower rates of delinquency and family 
disorganization, and achieve significantly higher scholastic 
attainments.
It is noteworthy that in all these studies of American 
values, those values of duties and obligations were rarely 
cited (compare with the Japanese in Chapter 3-“Goodman 195?• 
979-999)« Ultimately the mainstream American culture is 
highly demanding that its adult members taker on heavy duties
/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ Instead, perhaps 
all should graduate equally from high school, and then 
college? Yet competition for entrance, and then within 
the graduate and professional schools intensifies. Again 
is posed the inherent difficulty of reconciling Lipset's 
characterization of the basic American conflict between 
"equality versus achievement."
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and responsibilities. To many recently-matured persons 
these demands seem to "be sprung" suddenly and unmercifully 
just at adulthood. Many persons are inadequately equipped 
to cope at that time, and some are never able to measure 
up. In contrast to the scant, or very mild duty and 
obligations of age 16 or 17, come harsh and severe demands 
such as being drafted for war at age 18, or being a pregnant 
bride at 20.
The "independence" of modern teen-agers, Jules Henry 
(1963s260-26l) claimed, had nothing to do with the old 
1760 American frontier. Rather, the self-reliance of American 
teen-agers, as he studied them close-up through continued 
contact and observation, was "but a hollow shell." Henry 
held that this "independence" was the product of many 
weaknesses, "a mindless infantile egoism," the fruit of 
parental permissiveness.^ It meant simply: "doing what
one pleases." He found a "war" going on between the teen­
agers and their parents, the "kids" struggling to get out 
from under any control. But, he judged, the "kids" were 
very unsure of themselves. He also found a "war" going on 
between the teen-agers themselves, fearful of showing too
^Where the Handel and Lesser Danish comparison found 
the American parents exerted autocratic control, Jules Henry 
found these same type of parents unduly permissive. Kandel 
and Lesser operated via questionnaires furnished by students, 
Henry mainly by personal observation, close involvement, and 
questionnaires. Possibly the same questionnaire, as admini­
stered by Kandel or Lesser, if given to Henry's subjects, 
might have evoked the same "authoritarian" claims.
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much interest or affection for others lest they he deemed 
weak and dependent, and he belittled in the pecking order.
Here can he noted a cultural consistency, a longrun con­
sistency in the American culture. Lately, as well as back 
in 1760 and in the Rimrock frontier of 1950 or the aged 
frontier in San Francisco of i960, to be dependent was and 
is one of the worst value pitfalls that can happen to an 
American. Sometimes "independence" meant and means economic 
self-support independence— that stern imperative that 
takes over at adulthood— hut also throughout American 
life and history it seems to have applied equally to emotional 
independence. Even being emotionally dependent on another, 
according to Henry, involves high risk of rejection as 
being unworthy, or being deemed cheap, easy, or weak 
(Henry, 1963:258-260). By the folk patterns of values, 
an American was, and apparently is, supposed to walk alone 
(see Cohen 1966:239-241, Chapter 3)*
Critique: Henry is difficult to reconcile with the
rest of anthropological writings on the American culture—  
other than Clark and Anderson— since his tone is that of 
a revivalist reformer, righteously condemning the evils 
of American society. His work lacks perspective in that 
he makes no comparisons with any other society. Yet his 
probings of the teen-agers and later the geriatric hospital 
inmates furnishes useful insights, even though he scants 
the strength of the culture and focuses on what he deems 
its overriding pathological aspects. One cannot be certain
8̂
that this fear of emotional involvement is as singularly 
American as Henry says— though Cohen remarked that "the 
(American) plays a lone emotional game" (Chapter 3* and 
Cohen, 1966:2^1)— or if it is Anglo-North European, or 
merely human. However, we should at least offer as a 
possibility that this "lone emotional game" is an outgrowth 
of the Anglo-American culture of 1?60 developing its auto­
nomous orientation, its pride of economic independence, 
its pride and myth of stubbornly individual discrete charac­
ter strength. The explanation is suggested that this au- 
tonomous culture where the normative person was bereft of 
extended emotional and fraternal bonds has been able to 
survive, and in its perverse way flourish, because of the 
uniquely-American, relatively-easy economic possibilities 
and because of the driving cultural imperative of carving 
out a job and life alone, or nearly so. This culture is 
somewhat unique in that most men in other times were heavily 
dependent on and sustained by their web of bonds to each 
other.
Has old-time rugged Individualism become "insatiable 
greed"? Back in ■ 19*H Clyde Kluckhohn (19^1:169-171) stated 
that the individualism of the frontier spirit that had won 
the West had, in modern urban industrial society, become 
the social ill of egoistic individualism. He held that the 
venerated pioneer individual enterprise was now a cancerous 
cultural "dysteleology." Jules Henry stated that this 
American drive to achieve, acquire, master--which sprang
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from the circumstances of the suppressed of Europe being 
released to take advantage of the great opportunity for 
self advancement in exploiting and building up a rich 
continent— became at length a vice of Insatiable greed.
It was now manifest especially as consumerism, materialism, 
a major sickness of the American society (Henry 1963:6 ).
Kindredly, he affirmed (1966:101) that historic indi­
vidual achieving had been perverted to the endless consumerism 
of "egoistic consumption." In evaluation: This decried
process was all of a piece, one continuous evolution. The 
evolution from the frontier-farming achievement drive to 
get more land, buy more livestock, acquire a good looking 
buggy, a coal-oil lamp and then a gasoline lamp, a water- 
pumping windmill, became today's drive to get more consumer 
goods, private cars, color televisions, air-conditioners, 
better suburban living, private swimming pools. This is a 
logical continuum of sequential growth and achievement.
It is part of our deep seated values of acquisitive "conspic­
uous consumption" as the reward and hallmark of success.
The ecology-oriented minority face a monumental task if they
are to argue out, or render subordinate, this achievement-
6consumer satisfaction value. But when this trait is carried
It is noteworthy that the large 7-store Berkeley 
Co-op, founded 40 years ago primarily for consumers to 
consume more thriftily and with better quality, has these 
last 10 years shifted in ideology, becoming a political 
crusade group to attempt to downplay the consumption value 
and emphasize redistribution of wealth, ecological controls, 
racial equality, agricultural workers' power. The frequent 
recent conflicts within the Board of Directors reflect this 
clash between the old dominant /Footnote cont'd on following page/
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to extreme its socially adverse effects are clear.
Is the American driven intolerably by the demands of 
"the system," the culture? Related to the above consumerism, 
Henry (1963:13-30) held that American culture was forced 
on by its
...achievement, prcfit, mobility drives, and by 
the drives for security and a higher standard of 
living. Above all it is driven by expansiveness 
(1963:13).
He maintained that this achievement-success need had become 
transformed into the Frankenstein of imperative consumerism 
and dynamic obsolescence. He indignantly noted that in 
America everything— cars, homes, people— aged and became 
undesirable quickly, including the working person beset 
by uncertainty and technological "drivenness," He claimed 
that a large segment of the population worked in fear of their 
jobs being cancelled or automated out from under them—  
railway station masters, shipwrights, auto assemblers,
(space engineers?). Moreover he maintained that most people—  
those in the 6l$ of the population comprised of factory hands, 
mechanics, laborers, truck drivers, clerical and sales 
persons engaged in routine work requiring little education 
or initiative— found little satisfaction in their work.
/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ values of the 
1930-19^0"s established by Finnish immigrants with the liberal 
university-oriented middle class of that time, now transformed 
into the ultra-liberalized-radicalized national minority (but 
co-op majority) advancement of this new set of values. The 
Co-op now loses money for the first time, but the new majority 
feels this is a minor concern. A trend?
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Their type of work provided little gratification! it reduced 
the self to a cog. He held that people cared little for 
one another on the job since each was inherently replace­
able.
Howard Becker (1963:215) was in general agreement with 
Henry although he noted that the career elite seemed, to an 
extent, to find rewarding work in the American system. One- 
third of the sample of successful middle-aged males felt 
they were in control of their lives. They felt that autonomy, 
self-directed skill, and responsible social interaction were 
satisfactory, However, the majority of the sample, even the 
successful functioners, felt that they were in effect putting 
in time, merely earning a living without much personal choice 
or the joy of a sense of identity.
In evaluation: It is too early to say, and not
appropriate in this paper, whether the above findings or 
inferences are true— there is some indication that intellec- 
tualized researchers project their own feelings into 
evaluation of how blue collar or repetitive clerical workers 
feel about their jobs and lives. Nor can it be certain, 
if the findings turn out to be "true," that job dissatisfaction 
is the fruition of long-term American trends— the heightened 
expectation of a "better life" here and now, in a society 
that has been socialized to expect too much, including job 
satisfaction. Also, some critics would contend that a 
person's sense of identity should not hinge on the quality of 
his job. However, given the American identification of self­
worth with job success, this equation is inescapable for 
the normative individual. And, though some thus find the 
American job system wanting, the rest of the world appears 
to be striving hard to approach these high material standards 
of the American worker and the Interesting highly paid jobs 
of its professionals— 20% of our doctors are immigrants. 
However, other societies may have the advantage of cultural 
compensations and psychic bulwark in affllial emotional 
values, beliefs and the security of group-tied social co­
hesiveness— as the Japanese, and likely both the Chinese 
and North Vietnamese Communists.
Kluckhohn's Five Value Shifts - Evaluated
In noting value shifts, Kluckhohn (1958a:1^5-21?) 
adjudged the cultural trends as he found and projected them 
forward nearly 15 years ago. Now in retrospect we can 
judge whether he seemed to have really captured a valid 
trend or denominated an abortive or elusive one, or was 
just the prisoner of wish-fulfillment. Not all of his 
inferences are closely related to the themes autonomy and 
achievement. (An example is the valuation and participation 
in institutlonalized religion. Kluckhohn saw it as going 
up, and actually since 1965 it has been going down overall 
in numbers and in relative llfe-cycle significance, espe­
cially with the Catholic Church. The exceptions that have 
enjoyed numerical growth and unshaken conviction were the 
most traditional, participatory and member-committed 
Institutions with clear-cut standards, like the Mormons,
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Southern Baptists, Lutherans, Jehovah's Witnesses.)
The recent workings of the conformity trait, which 
in the American culture is the reciprocal, the reverse side 
of autonomy (Chapter 3)» Kluckhohn saw as emerging in a new, 
somewhat compromise form, which he characterized as 
"collective individualism." He discerned that the operation 
of the longstanding imperative of the conformity trait— the 
need for public approval, the dire psychic necessity of being 
liked and approved by one's peers— had, with the growth of 
social consciousness, started to take a socially constructive
form. The cumulative effects of the late 19th and 20th
/centuries' historic revelations and criticisms of the harsh, 
inhumane components of the American social system had begun 
to bring about a shift in values. As propounded in the 
writings and revelations of Steffens, Norris, Dreiser,
Upton Sinclair (especially with the national acceptance of 
Lewis' searching value criticisms contained in the national- 
character embodiment of Babbitt) these concerns began to 
take hold of the opinion-makers conscious value system.
The dominant norm began to shift. Kluckhohn foresaw that
I
this norm would henceforth become ever more involved in 
working toward a "collective individualism" more humane ana 
socially constructive.
He held that it was becoming fashionable and widespread 
in professional and business circles to be supportive of 
group values in community organizations, social class, pro­
fession, and various agencies for community uplift and
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healing. This was reflected in movements and organizations 
that were more social minded, more esthetic, and in support 
of more communal controls (Kluckhohn 1958a!185-7. 20^).
In evaluation! One can see Kluckhohn's trends advancing 
and widening to capture more supports as acceptance of laws 
banning discrimination in hiring and promotion, for instance, 
or executive programs for "affirmative action" whereby the 
disadvantaged minorities sometimes get preferences over 
equally or better qualified whites, or court orders for 
bussing for integration, or laws for ecological controls, 
or the ban on filling in any more of San Francisco Bay.
This social consciousness backs laws raising the level and 
accessibility of welfare so that about 10$ of the mainly 
urban population is on welfare, compared to only 20$ in 
the depths of the Great Depression when 25$ of the whole 
population was jobless. These value shifts are Reflected 
in the capture of the Berkeley Co-op by the militant 
crusaders (see footnote #6), the growing reluctance of 
judges and juries to convict and punish accused criminals 
and the attendant stress on reform rather than punishment.
It would appear that the old, high value placed by 
Americans upon morality, moralism, and righteousness, has 
been drifting from the success ethic of the ruthless, socially- 
irresponsible, self-made man toward an ethic of more social 
responsibility. This is accompanied by a feeling of unapproving 
tolerance activated by a somewhat uneasy but vulnerable 
guilt toward those who "haven't made it." However, the
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autonomousness of the Individual achievement is only lightly 
relieved for most folk in their acquiescing to these laws 
and attendant value shifts. In total, the above does 
indicate change toward group-beneficial values. Yet so far 
this trend appears to have cut very little into the essential 
autonomousness of individual living. One perhaps unsympa­
thetic observer with some contact with numerous local "communes" 
where groups of nonrelated people live together— usually to
seek some ties of surrogate family or fraternity— claims they
7are but "shifting way stations of lonely people."
A second significant shift advanced by Kluckhohn was 
that toward tolerance of heterogeneity (1958a:197-198) which 
would, if actual, be a significant break with the conformist 
patterns noted above. He cited the fact that protesters 
and deviates in American history were suppressed not by the 
police or government but largely by public opinion— in extreme 
cases by vigilantes. He noted that Americans were now more 
aware of other cultures, due to several circumstances of the 
mid-20th century: the presence of millions of American
servicemen abroad in World War II, the ease of foreign travel, 
growth of education, wider knowledge of the world and 
tolerance for differences, and the decline of authoritarian
7Estimates for Berkeley and adjacent Oakland range 
from 500 to 1000 of these group living arrangements; some 
are a structured fraternity with mutual obligations and . 
responsibilities, others operate with fluid arrangements 
and deteriorating home environment. A local real estate 
dealer put the average commune life at two years.
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8child raising. In evaluation: since Kluckhohn wrote,
particularly since 19^5. this trend has mushroomed— homo­
sexuals publicly sue for equal rights, athletes and working 
males wear hair that is not only shaggy but of a length 
and style considered in this century to be "female", the 
movies show explicit sexual intercourse and various forms 
of what has been deemed "depravity". In fulfillment of 
greater rights for diverse peoples, the films show blacks 
in superior sympathetic roles, voting requirements eliminate 
the necessity for reading English (ballots locally— San
Leander and Hayward, California— are printed also in Spanish
/
and Portuguese), abortions are furnished on demand, war 
protesters are sanctioned, the voting age in 1972 was lowered 
to 18. In terms of alternatives to the family, an increasing 
minority, say 5% or more, of men and women now dwelling 
together are doing so in trial marriages, coeducational 
dormitories, or shifting promiscuous colonies. Also, in the 
direction of wider rights, the Ralph Nader-led consumer- 
oriented attacks on business and on the quality, safety, 
and security of its products have been energetic. I
It has, on the whole and despite occasional use of 
left-wing fascism— as in "trashings", forcible breakage 
and ehtry, and disruption of free speech— been a period of 
feverish liberalization on many fronts. Among the factors
QThis continually noted "decline in authoritarian 
child-raising" is a curiously-recurring anomaly. Nearly 
every generation of observers since 1?00 has sagely noticed 
the same decline (Chapter 2). At that rate most or all 
authority should have disappeared long ago.
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helping to erode American national conceits have been the 
repercussions of the "no-win" (containment) Korean and 
Vietnam wars, and our failure to convert many subsidized 
countries like Korea or Ghana to our democratic values 
(despite, unexpected success in West Germany and Japan),
These 'failures', or qualified successes, have generated 
a great deal of American self-criticism and even cultural 
self-hatred, as expressed in intellectual "liberal" circles 
and made public in the Saturday Review, New York Review, 
and New York Times. There has thus occurred, despite the 
fact that the past war revived half of the world's economy, 
an erosion of American confidence in its historic mission 
of carrying the banner of righteous democracy and justice.
We seem suddenly to be mortal and flawed and uncertain of 
our values.
Perhaps Kluckhohn was correct in seeing that this 
tolerance of heterogeneity was already building up in the 
1950's. It has occurred as a product of the questioning 
of and loss of faith in old norms and values. Also, the 
liberalization movements are worldwide in all of the more 
affluent industrial nations; even the Swiss males voted 
for women's suffrage in 1971* What is its effect on our 
American thematic values? This reluctant acceptance of more 
deviation in life styles has been accompanied by growth of 
a small minority who have perhaps temporarily rejected the 
achievement "syndrome" and live very modestly, or beggarly, 
on part-time jobs, welfare food stamps or by "rip-offs"
(light stealing from the affluent, morally unreprehensible 
from this group's viewpoint). These latter values; should 
they grow in numbers and repute, could influence the built- 
in dedication of the American culture to autonomous achieve­
ment of jobs, status, money and other symbols. So far these 
unorthodox "dropouts" are too peripheral to be significant.
Some small percent of middle class youth "drop out" of the 
career work track or treadmill, but their places are speedily 
taken over by achievement-oriented "mainstreamers" or 
minorities, just admitted into the mainstream— as for example 
Pacific Gas & Electric's Black repairmen. The net result is 
downward social mobility for a few, a little more opportunity 
for upward mobility for others in a currently-tightening, 
reduced-opportunity career pyramid. The impact of the 
widespread liberalization may erode other values such as 
fealty, self-restraint, racial inequality, and heterosexuality, 
long before those trends have much effect on this basic 
American deep seated drive and need for personal achievement.
In a politico-cultural sense, the 1972 Presidential 
election was partly a contest between paragons of the old 
individual (autonomous) achievement values— "self-made", 
one-generation-up-from-working-poverty but middle class valued 
successes, as Nixon and Agnew— versus the more radical 
McGovern supporters who, as zealous social minded reformers, 
questioned the "materialistic" orientation of the mainstream 
of American society. These ultra liberals tended to reflect 
and support and urge ever more of the above liberalization
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trends and attempted to put the onus of immorality on their 
"establishment" and property-cherishing opponents. These 
ultra liberals held that the lauded differential achievement 
represented by a Henry Ford, Henry Kaiser, Howard Hughes or 
J. Pierpont Morgan was in great measure the product of influence, 
connections, tax loopholes, and of immoral, ruthless corporate 
and political wheeling and dealing. Though a sizable portion 
of the mainstream middle class, which since 1933 was nominally 
Democrat but as ever was also strong in its allegiance to the 
traditional acquisitive achievement valuer eventually and 
reluctantly swung toward McGovern, still he lost the majority.
i
The fatal tone of his campaign was set in the primaries where 
his closest supporters {k2% with Master's Degrees) weakened 
their credentials for liberal tolerance of variation by 
spurning the old Democratic Party politicos, the organized 
labor hardhats ("Archie Bunkers"), and the lower middle class.
In so doing they seemingly also rejected the normative 
American values of striving to get ahead and acquire property 
and material possessions--the symbols of achievement and bul­
wark for security. Tolerance of diversity, of political 
compromise, had not yet claimed 1972's most "liberal", or 
intolerantly radical, major political wing.
These new movements do not really seem to have breached
the wall of autonomy of each person--the fear, or bother, or
obligation of person-to-person involvement— although some
9have this as a major aim.
9
A not exceptional example is found in the neighbor, 
the chic, well-educated, /footnote cont'd on following page/
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A  third trend seen by Kluckhohn was toward hedonism--* 
that is, present time orientation, less acceptance of delayed 
gratification patterns, more self-indulgence (1958a:192).
He felt that the old-time Protestant Ethic value of putting 
off rewards until one had earned them through long struggle-- 
had in fact attained them as hallmarks of achievement— had been 
eroded by the values of "enjoying" it now," buying on time: 
appliances, cars, foreign travel trips, private swimming 
pools. This was reminiscent of Henry's consumerism imperative 
(above and 1936:6). Traditionally, these comforts and 
indulgences were expected to be earned and enjoyed in part 
as the symbols marking achievement, success-crowned. But 
now as they became more widely diffused because of adver­
tising, rising expectations and affluence, greater circles 
of people came to want them soon, to enjoy them now.
In evaluation: this expectation of current gratifica­
tion could also be a contributor to the United States' 
unparalleled modern nation crime rate. Even though the 
trend was predicted correctly--there has been a pronounced 
shift toward current consumption— still the evaluation should
/Footnote cont'd from preceding page/ autonomously striving 
"Mrs. Jones," divorced, her children largely with a house­
keeper, active in a range of establishment-attacking causes, 
marcher in protest parades, outraged contributor to the 
defense of those deemed wrongly accused by the "system."
She finally asked if her immediate neighbor to the 
west, Mrs. Wilson, an aged but pleasant lady, "was away?"
The answer was that Mrs. Wilson had died 10 days ago. The 
cause-oriented Mrs. Jones had never bothered to socialize 
with her aged neighbor. Her compassion was for causes, not 
individual people, especially not the aged who most need 
personal interest and neighborly compassion. This orientation 
is common among both Liberals and Conservatives.
be seen against the mainstream drive still operating to 
"save some, Invest some, borrow some." The normative aspir­
ants to higher professional status still devote years to 
higher education.-in hopes of attaining the admired and 
rewarded job status. Though there has been some slackening 
in the demand for college the last two years, there is no 
likelihood of ever returning to college enrollment levels 
of even ten years ago. Competition to enter medical and 
law, nursing and other professional-vocational schools has 
intensified in the 1970’s.
Like most social changes, this one is more of a modifi­
cation than a reversal. One could say that the deferred 
gratification pattern has been modified, moderated, and 
somewhat transfbrmed. Consider, as an example, the old 
Portuguese immigrant to Alameda County of 1900-1920, who 
was already imbued with the "Protestant" ("Portegee?") 
ethic, although unlike "WASPs" was supported by strong 
family affinity ties. He worked as a laborer six or seven 
days a week his entire life, never took his wife out to 
dinner, bought a car only with cash, and never "enjoyed 
himself" with frivolous expenditure. He finally died owning 
two or three houses^or an apartment house. His pattern has 
now elided into the pattern of his largely mainstream value- 
patterned son, "Franklin Delano Souza". Printer or painter 
or contractor, Souza now typically works only ^0 hours per 
week including overtime. He takes in shows, expensive Big 
League Football and Baseball games, takes his wife to Tahoe
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and on trips, buys his children bikes, and owns, only his 
own $27»000 suburban home. Yet he still manages to pay 
off his car and his house, and still saves some money—  
relative affluence allows a compromise. Notwithstanding, 
he more than ever wants his children to achieve, to "be 
somebody— not a no-good .lippie." He has scant tolerance 
for those taking welfare, and doesn't want public housing, 
or the kind of people that live in public housing, in his 
neighborhood or even in his largely middle class suburban 
city— Ban Leandro, parts of Hayward, Castro Valley, Pleasanton, 
Livermore, Dublin.
Kluckhohn's fourth significant point (1958a:19^) was 
that the American culture has, since 1933» undergone a great 
change in acceptance of government and other organizational 
control, and concomitantly demands, and is habituated to, 
a great amount of services and government support. Hence, 
many see this as an indication of erosion of self-reliant 
individualism. Before Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, 
1933-^5* scarcely anyone received a government check. Now
huge sectors, if not the majority, of the population receive
|'
such checks, directly or indirectly— Welfare, Social Security, 
Veterans, FHA-backed loans, Model Cities, Agricultural Price 
Supports, Soil Bank, grants for academic research or for 
highways or local;schools, revenue sharing.
In evaluation: although Americans have, since the
1700's, cherished a built-in antipathy toward authority 
and much government, there has been a nearly complete reversal
since 1933* Unlike most social change this one has embraced 
a wholesale acceptance of enormous government socialization 
programs, which have grown much larger in the national scheme 
even since Kluckhohn's writing, and are now embraced even by 
a Republican President, Richard Nixon. Possibly this may 
eventually erodetthe basic notion that persons should take 
care of themselves all their lives. So far, however, the 
erosion is very slight, since many feel that these checks 
either represent a form of deferred earnings, such as Veterans' 
Benefits or Social Security, or are "guilt payments", an 
equity or sharing with the less able or less fortunate.
Others consider that their knowledge and work preparing 
acceptable applications for grants for Model Cities or 
research or archeological rescue is a new but now legitimate 
way to pay one's way. One way or another, the stigma of 
welfare is escaped. "You're entitled" may insidiously 
erode this value of self-support reliance, and we have swung 
a considerable distance from the non-protected and non­
supported situation of the Pantexes. Yet within this reshaped 
economic system of a highepercent government largess and 
stipulations, the concept of autonomous achievement is still 
paramount even though adapted to the large bureaucracies 
of government and business and academia.
William H. Whyte's The Organization Man (1956) suggested 
along the postulate of Riesman that the normative American 
was, in the 20th century, shifting from an inner-directed 
man of conscience and integrity to an outer-directed organ!-
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zatlon man, constantly adjusting his behavior and values in 
order to be successful} thus he had no central integrity. 
However, as Upset and Lowenthal (1961) showed, while this 
characterization fulfilled the prophecy of those believing 
in the deleterious effects of the loss of old-time rugged 
individualism— for instance, Frederick Jackson Turner (1958)—  
it was not well founded, considering the evidence available 
on American character. As this paper has indicated, con­
trary to Whyte and Riesman, the normative American was 
other-directed, conformist, in values from the beginning.
It is conceded that the earlier American might have had much 
greater freedom in his daily decision making or in his 
mode of dress, and greater latitude for little eccentricities 
of behavior, when he dwelt on a remote frontier farmstead, 
compared to his modern counterpart, the office worker of 
a big urban bureaucracy. The continuing theme of this paper 
is that, in either case, frontier farm or metropolitan 
insurance hive, he was directed by the dominant values of 
autonomy and achievement. Mainly, it was the externals 
that changed. The way of making one's own climb shifted 
from cattle raising to car peddling or memo writing or gas 
station operating, but the individual drive to make more, 
get more, climb upwards, is undiminished. The number of 
attempts to found new businesses has not lowered.
Kluckhohn's fifth inferred value shift— The Equalization 
of the Roles of Men and Women (1958a:199)— was quite correctly 
discerned as an ever-growing trend, and has recently broken
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through strongly "on the coattails" of the ethnic/racial 
minority rights tidal wave. Suddenly, since 1965» it has 
exploded into "Women's Liberation" and (anti) "Male Chau­
vinism" movements. The Equal Rights Amendment to the United 
States Constitution has already passed Congress with the 
two-thirds vote of each house. The United States' Govern­
ment is taking widespread action against employers, clubs, 
against differential hiring and promotion, or admittance, 
by sex, or race, or ethnic; encouraging reverse preferential 
hiring in the near future to redress the balance. (Some laws 
also state equal rights for the aged and aging, but the 
society's values and its government do not really support 
these at all— "They have had their chance." Life is still 
very much regarded as a race, not a process of evolving.)
In these last two years the California State Supreme 
Court has found unconstitutional laws prohibiting women from 
working as bar maids or racetrack stable hands, or newsgirls, 
or limiting their maximum and nighttime hours of work. Thus 
laws designed to keep women out of what were considered 
degrading or dangerous or heavy work situations have been 
killed. Practices barring women from higher business or 
professional or blue-collar skilled jobs are under successful 
attack. • The concept of woman as "a lady" is rarely heard, 
but so too is the "gentleman" concept. To be "feminine" 
and to be a "feminist" now have divergent meanings. It is 
too soon to prognosticate whether this is fad or folk trend, 
whether it will level off or continue.
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Kluckhohn's views, written 15 years ago, were that 
American women were already the envy of the world for their 
relatively high status— higher percentage of higher paid 
female wage earners than any other Western society (though 
still much lower than men). This was coupled with the deeply 
engrained, pioneer, chi1! ilric, and New-England-schoolmarm 
status values of the society that elevated women to a moral, 
esthetic pedestal higher than men. They were considered 
the custodians of American culture and preceptors of moral 
values, pushers for educational, cultural, aesthetic and 
social betterment standards, the centers of family life and 
the basic teachers of values, a folk virtue embodiment in 
skirts to be looked up to. Kluckhohn noted that these shifts 
in values toward women's "equality" seemed to many men to be 
shifts toward women's dominance. To others today, the changes 
appear degrading to women and to the society. Kluckhohn 
stated that the chance was fraught with domestic tensions 
and disruptions of heretofore accepted social relationships. 
Now the pedestal is shaken: virginity, modesty, and deference 
are, in dominant values, down-graded somewhat. Some localI'
entertainments presenting bestiality feature participant.
women. Rape along with other violent crime has increased, , 10 several fold.
_ _
Prom August 15 to 2k, 1972, nine days, New York City 
experienced 6k homicidesj none were gangland, just an increas­
ing part of the current American culture trend. For all of 
England (50 million people) the Entire 1970 homicide figure 
was 1^5; Norway, k; San Prancisco, 14-5•
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At the same time, women are, in small numbers, becoming 
telephone linemen and truck drivers, and gardeners. They 
are also seeking, with government sponsorship,’ to become 
professors, a trend pioneered especially in anthropology. 
Abortions in urban states now exceed birth; the birth rate 
has dropped lower than it was in the depths of the 1930's 
depression. The divorce rate has accelerated as women 
increasingly seek their individual fulfillment; more children 
thereby will grow up likely to experience divorce themselves. 
Small children are.put into day care, trending toward the 
well-nightuniversal practice of Russia and China. There is 
an ever-increasing demand by women's groups for more day care 
centers and also for men to stay home part or full time and 
take care of the children. All this is a drastic, confused 
and violent shake-up of values, with great repercussions 
across the social board, the cultural patterns. Especially 
the family seems to be shaken, reduced in a significant 
percentage of cases to a divorced woman and her one or two 
children. Yet deeper values don't change so drastically 
en masse; it is likely that a counter movement will arise, 
as Life-right has arisen to battle the victory of easy 
abortion.
What are the effects of these changes, for the purpose 
of this paper? Totally unanticipated by Kluckhohn, whose 
most significant value trend change noted under autonomy 
and achievement was increasing socially constructive "collec­
tive individualism" ("wish fulfillment?") (above and 1958as
10 *1-
185-7, 20k), is this current intensification of competition 
to achieve.
The effect of this thrust of women, blacks, Mexicans 
and the other official minorities (as designated and supported 
and favored by the United States government^) is to intensify 
and worsen competition to achieve. More and more women, 
blacks, and others are, by peer pressure from organized 
pressure groups, induced to partake of the American imperative 
to achieve. They are being stimulated and driven in their 
assimilation of the dominant folk values to aspire to take 
on the roles and high status heretofore achieved by white 
males. It can be foreseen that the pressures may escalate 
well-nigh intolerably. Competition and ultimate frustration 
for the normative achievers, especially for white males who 
for all the American generations have been socialized to 
expect that they should attain success in high status positions, 
may become dreadful. It could pit person against person, 
woman against man, in the most egocentric self-seeking way.
It could accelerate the divorce rate as men fail to measure 
up to the expectations and/or job status of their wives.
Despite marginal rejections of the "system" by a few, 
scores of highly and newly ambitious "newmen" or "new persons" 
press forward, working, striving to exploit for their personal
^ I n  1972 a street paving firm, Souza Brothers, 
entirely of Portuguese descent, was ruled ineligible and 
had its longtime contract cancelled by the City of Oakland 
by ruling of the dispensers of Federal Funds that the Souzas 
were not an approved minority group.
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autonomous ascent this newly opened up equality of oppor­
tunity. This old American ideal, heretofore only fraction­
ally realized, is now being pushed to the hilt. No other 
country has attempted so radical an equalization of oppor­
tunity, and perhaps ultimately of status. But within this 
potential lie the seeds of great possible disillusionment 
when the frustration De Tocqueville identified becomes 
manifest— "most are doomed to relative disappointment in a 
democracy."
Compounding the potential for social disruption is
the coincidence that this accelerated trend of intensifying!
competition has occurred at a juncture when the reformist 
movements have been successful in leveling off population 
growth. Thus, a sudden oversupply of qualified status- 
seekers in many fields, notably in academia from Ph.D.'s 
on down, is coincidental with an intensification of compe­
tition to achieve. A shift threatens in the American society's 
cultural expectations from a norm of constant expansion with 
its accompanying multiplication of opportunities for achieving 
higher status, to a society of little or no growth. This 
could, and seems likely to, gradually throw the United States 
back into the mentality of the post-medieval Europe that it 
sought to escape, as it is faced with a static no-growth 
structure.
In such a society opportunities are much more limited 
for personal status achievement— akin to Foster's peasant 
culture (1965) of limited good'— where more for one means
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less for others. There would likely be an Increasing economic 
reward of more affluence for all, but with rising expecta­
tions based on dominant American values, that is a minor 
consideration. The values of the culture place the goal 
according to relative achievement, toiling to high status, 
getting something "better than" (somebody else). This 
"crunch." would likely result in a high percentage of frus­
trated people, and increase political and social instability, 
threatening the practice of American democracy itself.
The question arises: could other replacement values
take over? At this writing, present social movements for 
ever greater individual achievement, and for accelerating 
achievement catch-up for those newly admitted to full compe­
tition, seem to be growing in strength. Since these achieve­
ment drives are rooted more deeply in the basic drives of 
the culture than the newly launched counter movements to 
"cool" the drive, they would appear to be most likely to 
continue ascendant. The new ethic would urge fulfillment 
in a limited vocational handicraft or some "non-productive" 
or "genuinely creative" activity or group sharing instead 
of own-ownership. Though there is"this incipient latter 
trend, it appears miniscule and highly unattractive so far.
It is noteworthy that militant leftwing or other collec­
tive movement groups are consciously aware of the evils of 
American individualism. Most have made conscious efforts 
to lessen the typical atomistic American autonomy and gain 
collective reinforcement by cultivating group identity ties
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as Women's Liberation and Lesbians' "sisterhood", black 
"soul brothers", La Raza Unlda, all somewhat akin to an 
earlier generation's "Brotherhood" of Train Men. Yet despite 
this stress on collateral!ty— on brotherhood or sisterhood—  
the result has been, with rare exceptions like the Black 
Muslims, that these are now hotly aspiring people are basically 
and deeply socialized in the main American value patterns.
They therefore operate along the autonomous achievement paths 
of the mainstream values. As Americans they are probably 
unable to operate otherwise— -baring the exceptional value 
changes that rarely forge new cohesive patterns of group 
identities--as with the Muslims and Mormons and Hutterites.
It seems to require a religion, a supernatural sustenance, 
a commitment to make such groupness work in the United 
States.
Those from the subcultures, say of the ghetto or barrio, 
heretofore not fully socialized in the mainstream, must in 
order to compete already have or speedily must integrate 
these individual achievement values and drive for success.
For "liberation" and "equality" means in large measure, in 
the context of American culture, higher job successes and 
definite measurable growth in relative incomes. "What 
percent are at Grade level 15? What percent are tenured?"
For the bulk of the newly activated achievement race-runners, 
like the blacks and the white women, the autonomy is cored 
in already. No change is necessary. They already come from 
an egocentric individualistic, non-collateral orientation.
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Latinos from a folk-culture sometimes must, along with
other adaptations to modern industrial society, make some
conversion to this orientation. As in the case of Romano
12Banuelos, Treasurer of the United States, any lingering 
collaterallty tends to be yielded in order to make the lone 
climb up the individual ladder of success.
Creativity and Crack-ups. Hsu suggested the possibility 
of the conformity trait generating a constructive as well 
as the stated negative corollary. Hsu's concept is that 
of "creative conflict": he held (1963:222-227) that some
Americans react positively against the conformist norm, and 
in so reacting come up with reformatory and creative move­
ments. In some sectors these alterations receive favorable 
reception since in the value system creativity is deemed 
good (change is good, change is progress). So individuals 
may escape psychologically the constraints of the system, 
its imperative value patterns, through individual variations 
amounting to escapes from conformity and cathexes (the 
investment of emotional significance in an activity, object 
or idea). In evaluation: since Hsu did not offer specific
12In her climb from 17-year-old penniless immigrant 
of 19^» with two infants back in Juarez and no husband, 
up to Treasurer of the United States in 1972, she allegedly 
victimized fellow Mexican-Americans by paying substandard 
wages in her Los Angeles tortilla factory. This she denies. 
She is known as a hard-driving person; she was the founder 
of a successful bank, the first Mexican-immigrant-oriented 
bank in Los Angeles. She seems well integrated into the 
mainstream American culture with the requisite autonomous 
achievement success values. She contends that you have to 
be "hard boiled", reject demands of compatriots for indul­
gence, in order to get ahead.
109
illustration, one can only indicate tenatively that the 
idea may have merit. It is not clear whether Hsu's "mavericks" 
were tilting against the more superficial conformity that 
suppresses eccentricity, "beards, or proper dress, or whether 
they were successful protestants against the deeper confor­
mity of needing group approval for their work achievement 
and betokening life styles. It was not stated how these 
creative nonconformists would handle the dire imperative 
of going along with the crowd in values. Moreover, in some 
areas, ostensible nonconformity might in reality be a form 
of conformity since there are long-standing American values 
sanctioning and approving newness, innovation, change for its 
own sake. In current lower educational circles professional 
reputations seem to be built by School Superintendents 
launching new systems— like ungraded classes, open classrooms, 
heterogeneous groupings and the like. Some try a new system 
yearly. In most fields, however, he who';.would start a real 
alteration, like criticising operation of a bureau or trying 
in higher education to transcend the departmental subject 
matter jurisdictions, generally fail.
Yet creative alteration as a reaction to conformist 
pressure is one explanation of how this conformist-in-value 
society is so technologically innovative. Changes in 
technology are much more easily accepted than shifts in deeper 
values, as in forgoing the lifetime achievement competition 
or accepting a more intensive degree of local policing and 
individual public responsibility.
Korea Misgivings s The experiences of the Americans 
taken prisoner by the Communist Chinese during the Korean 
War (Dahrendorf 196I:193-^)» 1950“1953» brings into question 
the absolute value of autonomous achievement. These experi­
ences raise the question of whether values that were so 
pragmatically effective in the building of America are as 
effective in sustaining a society, or sustaining even indi­
vidual life, when put to a cruel test under suppressive 
conditions. These prisoners were put to the utter test of 
actual survival. They were subjected by their captors to 
intensive value pressure. These "brain-washing" clinics 
cleverly exploited the basic American autonomousness and 
latent or potential distrust of each man for the next.
They acted on the supposition that each person conceived 
the other from infancy more as a competitor than as a cooper­
ating ally or friend. From all evidence the captors were 
able to reduce several thousands of young Americans to a 
non-relating collection of egocentric individuals, each 
blindly oriented only to his own welfare, and callous to 
others' survival. Sick men were thrown out of the hutches 
by their colleagues to die; many put blankets over their 
heads and died, their will to live gone. Of the total,
38$ died, though they had sufficient rations. In contrast, 
the Turkish prisoners, who came from an authoritarian, 
group-oriented (and harsh economic) background, all survived, 
maintaining their discipline and coherence, caring for their 
sick, maintaining their integrity.
In evaluation; These facts above have, in some inter- 
preters' hands, been deemed not so damning to our culture, 
in that perhaps the Chinese manipulators made much greater 
and more skillful efforts to break down the Americans than 
on the obdurate Turks, and perhaps these American soldiers, 
being largely less-educE ̂ ed draftees, were unrepresentative 
of the dominant middle class and its values. Still, the 
debacle raises the spectre that possibly these values may, 
in fact, have serious internal defects that become apparent 
when the society or the individual is put to great adverse 
stress. These men needed to cooperate and sustain one another, 
but they were unable to. The Chinese manipulators had 
studied the American culture and unerringly struck at its 
weak, non-supportive, aspects (perhaps they had read Hsu?
(195D )•
One explanation of the normal organizational effective­
ness of Americans in contrast to this breakdown under extreme 
pressure could be that institutional channels and sanctions 
of school, job, and government as superimposed on the basic 
autonomous urge to achieve, keep the American "programmed"
i'
and oriented to functioning effectively. In response to 
immediate institutional and socially approved rewards and 
penalties, he works cooperatively and effectively with his 
fellow workers or fellow tax-payers, though he always has 
deep in his mind the competitive insecurity that he could be 
laid off or fired— unlike the Japanese culture. But remove 
these institutional channels, their rewards, sanctions, and 
supports, and a basic alienated, fearful-of-others personality
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takes over. It is possible that there is lacking a suffi-
*
ciently strong internal "gyroscope" to keep the individual 
steadfastness viable when the external social framework is
removed. When said institutions are eliminated or their/
control weakened the intrinsic volunteer patterns are too 
weak to overcome the culture's autonomousness and get men to 
cooperate— even when the alternative might be collapse and 
death, one by one, individualistically. Despite protestations 
to the contrary, it is held that group sacrifice and commit­
ment are alien to the culture. These latter can be developed 
under special conditions (Chapter 3) but the collaterality 
background is not there to evoke. This is a harsh judgment.
This breakdown in American behavior and sustaining 
values is reminiscent of the possible effects of autonomous 
values expressed in Cohen’s "Lone Bnotional Game" (Chapter 
3, and 1966:2^-1), and in Henry's quote of De Tocqueville 
(Chapter 3» and 1966:105-6): "The American had the feeling 
that one stands alone, no one really cared whether one lived 
or died." This breakdown could also be related to Kandel 
and Lesser's (1968:3^8-58 ..and Chapter suggestion that 
Americans operated more in response to external constraints 
(than Danes), and had but weak internalized norms of behavior.
A reading of eye-witness accounts of some epochal 
crisis situations in American history, such as the crossing 
of the plains and mountains in the California Gold Hush, 
with its hardships, social organization and disorganization, 
yields some antecedents or forerunners of the later American
behavior under duress in Korea. The prized Mwinning-of-the- 
West" individualism also revealed a large coimponent of ego­
centric, socially Irresponsible, every-man-for-himself behavior. 
In their eagerness or greed to cover miles, win land, grasp 
treasure, some Argonauts did cooperate loosely and fleetingly, 
but many died, too, for lack of commitment to a cohesive 
organization. Of those who succeeded in crossing the continent, 
many, if not the majority, ended up in the 1870's and l880's 
California as destitute derelicts, without family. Each had 
carved out his own career. This sector of the American 
character is worth more investigation— as a potential national 
fault that, could contribute to national collapse under 
sufficient duress.
Sub-Summary to Inferences Problematical. In the section 
above was presented a variety of authorities’ inferences on 
the nature, development and effects of American cultural 
trait-values associated with the thematic autonomy and 
achievement. Some inferences seemed to fit well, although 
based on theories still in dispute, as that of very stringent, 
very early toilet training producing compulsively anxious 
personalities, e.g. the modal American (Murphey above).
Some challenged the fairly widespread historical view that 
the modal American personality shifted from an 1800 model 
of sturdy, self-reliant, self-directed personality to a 
modern peer-directed conformist pattern. Jules Henry's 
companion view that the pioneer virtues were transformed 
into modern vices was presented and then disputed, as not
114
recognizing elements of continuity and internal (but para­
doxical) consistency in cultural values evinced all the way,
1760 to i960. Counter views in support of some transforma­
tion in socialization of the young during these historic 
two American developmental centuries were presented. Authori­
ties like Benedict and i.su were cited for their ideas on 
discontinuities in American socialization. The theme of a 
"lone emotional game" of both Cohen and, in his rather 
singular social-critic way, Henry, was offered as an apparent 
intrinsic trait stemming from the thematic pair. Kluckhohn's 
1950's appraisal items of noted and predicted value shifts
Iwere explored and discussed to see how valid they seemed in 
their manifestations 15 years later, and whether anything 
fundamental in a shift in values was transpiring. It turned 
out that he predicted some value trends correctly and on 
others he misprojected. The questions posed by the social 
and personality disorganization of the American captives of 
the Chinese Communists in the Korean War were raised as possibly 
an exposure of inherent weakness of the American value system.
Overall, this section was meant to be left open-endedr
and exploratory. The explanations for unreconciled findings 
were meant to be tentative and provide ideas for future 
considerations. In social science and in the study of American 
culture there is much that is fluid, and there is much we 
do not know, much data yet to be found, much paradoxical 
phenomena still to be related. However, where there was 
seeming evidence of regularities, logical or possible cause
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and effect, it was so indicated. Potential areas to be delved 
deeper were suggested, such as the implications and possible 
recurrence of the breakdown of the American prisoners of the 
Chinese in Korea in the 1950's»
Summary Assessments and Considerations
In this latter part of the chapter an overall, balanced 
perspective will be sought. The authorities cited throughout 
this paper have been fairly well balanced. One group con­
sisted of those relatively critical of American society and 
culture, such as Jules Henry, Margaret Clark and Barbara 
Anderson, and Francis L. K. Hsu. These were countervailed 
with authorities largely approving, such as Clyde Kluckhohn, 
Seymour Lipset. A middle group were the considerable number 
who called the traits as they saw them, neither pro nor con. 
They found dynamic thrust in the balance of tensions, as in 
the constructiveness of competition and the fear of for­
sakenness in failure. This group, from De Tocqueville to 
Goldschmidt, meted out both approbation and social criticism. 
However, since the negative effects of autonomy and achieve­
ment and its reciprocals of conformity and insecurity have 
constituted a considerable bulk of this paper's presentation, 
it is pertinent to remark here for the sake of perspective, 
that the American society and its culture has been one of 
the most successful of all. In terms of economic well-being 
for most of its people, and of opportunity to rise, political 
freedom of expression, individual career freedom, it has 
been unequalled. It has also been strong in pursuit of
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idealistic as well as material goals. Of all large nations 
the American has been the pioneer in lowering the barriers 
of political participation to include successively poorer 
or lower orders of people. Especially lately, both through 
idealism and guilty liberalism it has initiated programs 
to compensate and afford greater achievement opportunity for 
those from groups or ethnics adjudged rendered unfairly weak 
by "the system" in the competitive race. Through government 
taxing and therefore partial wealth redistribution, it seeks 
to provide low achievers a greater share in the ever-rising 
minimum standards of living, including medical care, education 
and job satisfaction,
Several cultural historical treatments of the 1950's 
reaffirmed not only the continuities of American socio­
political values but also the continuous ’thread of high 
idealism, even if short-fallen in execution, of American 
values and social practices— Daniel Boorstin (1953). Louis 
M. Hartz (1955). Ralph Gabriel (1956) (in Lipset and Lowen- 
thal, 1961).
How then did these autonomous achievers, these insecure 
conformists, these historic every-man-for-himself land 
grabbers, achieve and build together such a nation of world­
wide prominence, envy, and hope for the oppressed peoples and 
nations? Why has it continued to be the refuge for the 
persecuted (whites), ranging from the Eastern European Jews 
of the 1900's to the Cubans and the daughter of a Russian 
dictator, Svetlana Stalin, in the 1960's? Why is it that,
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for many, If not most of the world’s peoples, this American 
society is still, even with its sum of individual insecurity, 
considered the most desirable prototype society to emulate?
The national achievement answer seems to lie in the paradox, 
the thesis-antithesis, that the "independent” anti-authority 
Individualist American also carries a culturally indigenous 
trait of willingness to submit and cooperate effectively with 
and in and under the direction of a formal government operation 
However, for an American so to submit and cooperate, the 
circumstances of time and situation must indicate such 
subordination as a generally acceptable proposition. The 
"ppers" must be convinced— public opinion must so indicate.
The waging of World War II represented full public support 
and peer pressure. The necessity of recalling all American 
ground troops in Viet Nam after 1968 represented the with­
drawal of public support— and peer pressure.
In this government, the beneficiary of a thousand years 
of English trial and error and gradually crafted democracy, 
the American political culture contained also the elements 
of working to compromise. The normative person would /submit 
to compulsion of taxing, and ultimately even the historically 
rejected "Old World" bodily draft ("conscription") providing 
that in public opinion (peer standards) it was,considered 
really justified. This could be considered the essence of 
democracy, though possibly not by those resisting conscription. 
Perhaps the covert conformity trait, the need for public 
approval, facilitated this acceptance of the compulsory hand
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of government, even though this government control was
historically resented and on lesser issues was often stymied,
Emerson said that a good citizen should not obey the laws
too well. The residual feeling of 200 years of anti-authority
still flows in the ambivalent public attitude toward the
13police and law enforcement.
So through American history we have had the conflict of 
authority versus freedom. Youth would grow up, reject 
parental and township authority, and yet settle further west 
in their maturity and establish new authority. In the new 
settlements a community concensus would grudgingly tax them­
selves as the need became manifest. Through the ideological 
objections of Old Time Liberalism these transplanted posts 
of American society would be slower to tax, slower to control
13This antithesis emerges strikingly in the Berkeley 
scene.,’ This atypical, but possibly bellwether forerunner- 
type community has recently generated surprising grass roots 
volunteer social efforts, as when the "people" took by force 
State (.University of California) property for a "Peoples 
Park." They leveled the fence twice, in 1969 and 1971* In 
a paradoxical way, it has become a conservator or reinstigator 
of old frontier, anti-government populist values, at least 
in terms of public control of people's persons.
Yet the Council majority like Populists of old (or 
Socialists of the future) have been eager to use the taxing 
power of their government to "soak the rich" and affluent, 
and even small holders, by levying of rent control laws and 
greatly increased business license fees.
The City Council's avowed "radicals" torn between responsi­
bility as the people's representatives and this latent popu­
lism— "government is bad"— reflect this old American ambiguity. 
In 1971 Oakland took advantage of a Federal grant for a police 
helicopter; Berkeley rejected the same, fearing "Big Brother's" 
surveillance. Physically, the cities merge into one another, 
but the values differ, showing variations, or possibly stages 
in development.
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the freedom of property and the individual self-determination 
of disposal of his income than in the old European or Japanese 
cultures. In America, in attaining collective community 
betterment, there was considerable time lag compared to older 
more historic societies. There was much resistance to 
instituting programs and taxing and getting acceptance of 
the loss of some individual freedom. Surprisingly, these 
anti-government individualists generally, in time, paid their 
taxes, though the arch, old-time typical Appalachian moun­
taineers enjoyed defying the Revenue Man, avoiding the payment 
of "moonshine" taxes. Even today a 100-year-old American 
town such as Missoula is apt to have much less community- 
enhancing development and controls as central square malls, 
community-sponsored cafe-gathering centers, elimination of 
wrecked auto hulks and debris about town, preservation of 
old landmarks, in comparison to a German, Swiss, Scandinavian, 
or even old New England town.
So a national government emerged that could do a minimal 
job, a regular Army was created that was allowed barely 
enough strength to cope with Indian uprisings. A dual, 
complicated system of courts, State and Federal, was insti­
tuted in fear of concentrated, monolithic power. These 
court systems grew enormously, accruing great and decisive 
power as they carried out law in an especially complex, 
litigation-rife fashion. This reflected a need for govern­
ment control or umpire institutions, after all. Time after 
time the trait for legal security coped with the illegal
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frontier avarice in occupation of land. "Squatter Sover­
eignty" was frequently legitimized as a fait accompli, as 
with the "Sooners", who slipped into Oklahoma prior to 
l889t and with the Pre-emption Acts. The juxtaposition of 
the hunger for property and the need for order was recognized 
in laws legitimizing muon frontier individual jungle law.
So a web of commerce developed, basically privately owned, 
and profit- (individual achievement)-motivated, yet under a 
governmental protective web, that of late has grown so that 
its branches encompass most Americans in one way or another. 
The old-time tacitly accepted minimal government has become
i
enormously large and powerful, therefore strongly decisive, 
yet the tension between private and public continues into 
housing, into use of resources. The United States' society's 
culture, a daughter of England's, carries a unique inter­
play, an interweaving or jousting of these twain antithetical 
values. The accumulative effects of egocentricities have 
been, nationally speaking, mitigated by the acceptance of 
governmental controls and services.
The process has, in fact, not been so different from the 
trend perceived in 1958 by Kluckhohn, toward "collective 
individualism", except that it is much more vested in agencies 
of government control with much subordination of the indi­
vidual, than he expected. This system of democratic govern­
ment compulsion as a substitute for voluntary collateral 
cohesion was working all the while. It worked poorly with 
the Pantexes (Chapter 1), more effectively in a modern
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California town, with its myriad codes, where unpaved streets 
or unplumbed houses are generally no longer permitted.
Lately., governmental "collectivism" has taken in much more 
terrain, from the early, simple township government services 
of schools and constables to the modern massive system of 
federally backed loans, state pollution standards, aid to 
dependent children and tax money spent for the hungry of 
India or for bombs in the Vietnam War. Kluckhohn favored 
the type of "collective individualism" that operated in 
volunteer social uplift sectors— working for more art, civic 
improvement, libraries, educational facilities. These 
volunteer-supported groups have burgeoned, also, but rela­
tively much less than the constraint management of government 
Federal, State, City, County, School, Special Districts—  
tax upon tax, public services and control upon control and 
management. Thus the affluent incomes won from differential 
achievement have been redistributed somewhat— not enough 
for Socialists but far too much from a 1900 American view.
Thus the normative autonomous American operated 
successively from the frontier into settled communities of 
ever-increasing community life, using some few volunteer 
organizations, such as fire departments. Most significantly, 
the normative American's life career was fulfilled in a web 
of business and government organizations. From the 1880's 
giant corporation, through the giant government of 1900 and 
especially since 1933» the web has grown, the percent of 
people working for someone else has increased, to become the 
norm. Though the normative American continued personally
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autqnomous, his necessary acceptance of direction, discipline, 
and labor-coordinating control of, say, the Northern Pacific 
Ballroad, made this autonomous achiever in fact a collateral 
achiever in his work-day, work-life organization. But this 
collateral!ty had no deep kinship or permanently enduring 
affilial ties. It was more a loose confraternity of, say, 
mobile railroad telegraphers like Chet Huntley's father 
Pat (Huntley 1968:155)• Initially the small company, then 
the giant corporation, and latterly the giant government 
has supplied the American society the necessary organization, 
productive efficiency facilities and the work-a-day social 
cohesion. These institutional surrogates have operated 
somewhat in place of the ties and supports of lineality 
and collateral!ty (See Chapter 3, Caudill and Scarr 1962:53“
91, and Florence Kluckhohn 1950*382-3) that had been largely 
eliminated from American culture prior to, during, and 
shortly subsequent to, the ocean crossing from Mother England. 
Motivating achievement factors included pride in achievement, 
hope of climbing to higher status, some satisfaction either 
in developing one's own "spread" (ranch) or farmstead,i
store, or, increasingly, in attaining a responsible role 
in a business, corporation, or in times of stress for the 
nation, in the military, and lately in government organization. 
These were the gears, the machinery furnishing billets, work 
opportunities, that enabled the autonomous achiever to, 
in effect, work cooperatively and build up his wealth and 
status, and that of the United States.
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■ Kluckhohn's last word (1958^:165-7) was that the auto­
nomy, the orientation to individual achievement, was still 
the core motivating force, and a dedicated grasping privatism 
went along concomitantly (though he hopefully discerned 
trends toward amelioration). Thus the normative American 
who was forced (in the case of Pat Huntley) by his failure
lAin pioneering and by Industrialization, to work for the 
big corporation, still adhered to his goals of making his 
way independently of help or hindrance from kinfolk, and 
regardless of his town or class or origin. As ever in
American history the dominant values held him responsible
/
for supporting his nuclear family (only), He jealously guarded 
what wealth or home he could acquire. He was ignorant of 
the extent to which his values were molded into a confor­
mist pattern of lone achievement, since he was socialized 
to believe that there was no acceptable alternative— even a 
military career in 1920 was very suspect, Kluckhohn, more­
over (1958a:187), argued somewhat contrarlly and perhaps 
idealistically that Americans might conform exteriorly in 
order to husband their psychic energy inwardly to develop 
their unique personal potential (See Hsu's oathexes,
Chapter k and 1963:223-227). This the writer would deem 
a goal achieved perhaps by a small minority, but not by the 
dominant majority socialized to be dependent on public 
approval.
■^Most of those attempting to homestead in Northern 
Montana, 1910-192^-, were so doomed.
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As noted, the achievement-bound normative American 
has no compunctions about forsaking his roots, his hometown, 
his homeclass, his old friends. The conformity comes in 
molding his career along expected lines of promotion and 
advancement, which leads to the judgment that the striver is 
an "operator", the classic Dick-Nixon-llke opportunist who 
allegedly lacks integrity (Whyte 1956:5, 6, 11, 135)• However, 
it could equally be said that this constant "trimming" and 
adjusting of the normative American shows great social 
acuity and consideration of others (peers and bosses) in 
adapting to new situations, new demands, new sets of people,^ 
(Lipset 1963:132). Only a few can go the whole route,
"to the top," zigzagging their way upward. The Huntley 
father, b o m  in Wisconsin as one of seven children, moved 
west at adulthood, was bested in his Montana homestead 
attempt, 1913-1920, and ended up as a lifetime railroad 
telegrapher. He was closer to average than an Andrew Carnegie. 
But he and Carnegie shared those same achievement values,
Pat Huntley would unquestionably have made the climbing 
zigzag had his opportunity opened up. His son did. Histori­
cally, we would never have heard of these normative men,
Pat Huntley and John Anderson Truman, except for the chance 
of their sons' exceptional achievements.
•^Studies indicate that those who move about geographi­
cally and those who move up status-wise, tend to have signi­
ficantly greater chance of heart attack than those who stay 
put. The latter achieve less and live longer— Harry Truman 
excepted.
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The working out of autonomy and achievement has also 
been in the context of a fuzzily-held but pervasive value 
equality. According to the frontier and Declaration of 
Independence^ ethos Americans were supposed to be equal 
in that one man was as good as another, until he proved 
he was better. Each man was entitled to equal treatment 
before the law, unless he could pull strings for preferential 
treatment. Each man should have the same opportunity to 
rise, though it helped to marry the boss's or richest man's 
daughter, as did Abraham Lincoln, Each man should be
addressed by a common equalitarian term, unless he could
/
get elected and be referred to as the "Honorable." These 
somewhat conflicting values have continued in uneasy asso­
ciation. Their on-going manifestations are presented in 
the paradoxes between adherence to equality and (differen­
tial) achievement— the basic American need to feel superior 
to someone (Henry above, and 1$66). Sometimes these values 
reinforced or moderated one another (Lipset, 1963:123)* 
for instance, the feeling that the effect of the special
favoritism and "pull" (examples above) should be minimized.
• \
And the highly individually competitive United States' society
Hofstadter felt that at theotime the Declaration of 
Independence was written, the phrase about equality actually 
meant only that an American was equal to an Englishman of 
the same class, but as later interpreted has come to mean 
that every man is (potentially) as good as another. Children 
start the race of life with equal opportunity to succeed.
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has minimized these greatly with its merit system and merit­
ocracy, as compared to more traditional collaterally-oriented 
societies as in Iatin America, Africa, Asia, though the latter 
have decried the American system as cold, heartless, devoid 
of sustaining ties.
Individually, achievement has been the cultural tyrant.
If a man proved he was "better" he attained £>owerr' and position. 
Then he was entitled to enjoy the benefits. Those who proved 
themselves to be less good or to be "losers" should "take 
their medicine", sometimes attributed to "luck." This value 
pattern also produced those ill effects of the "loser" or 
even middle achievers, who, feeling themselves mediocrity 
failures, succumbed to the corrosive effects of normlessness, 
especially in the middle and later years (Clark & Anderson 
1967:11-18, 325)• Goldschmidt held that though it produced 
much achievement, this American system also produced much 
seeming failure— failure to achieve as much as the better of 
one's peers. He held that the .system resulted in much family 
and personal tension, whether the individual was deemed a 
failure or a success (1955:1216), Prom these writers' 
studies and from Henry's, and from participant observation, 
this writer’s opinion is that these losses, these frustrations 
and self-doubts of those who have hit their status ceiling,' 
is probably much more widespread and debilitating than has 
so far been revealed. Other reports by psychologists and 
psychiatrists, and contacts with people, indicate a widespread 
Incidence of this malaise. However, most men would tend to
12?
keep it unexpressed, as public confession of failure would be 
damning for an American of the dominant cultural pattern. De 
Tocqueville said that if a man fails in self-reliance, if he 
falters, is a "loser", then he feels forsaken, impotent, his
17peers are unsympathetic and tend to abandon him (Henry 1963:6 ).
Loneliness: Another penalty paid for this autonomy-
achievement orientation, in the opinion of several authorities,
is that the normative American experiences a great sense of
loneliness, not just when aged but all along the life line.
Cohen (Chapter 3 and 1966:2^1) stressed the "lone emotional
game." Brodbeck (1961:^3) especially found this theme of
loneliness all through American history, from the obvious
lonely plains on through to teeming but impersonal cities
and the autonomy of suburbia. In the American patterns this
loneliness may arise from the aforesaid lack of collateral!ty,
extended family or group ties, lack of lineality, lack of roots
as mobility and status-climbing shuttles the individual about—
18often more than a thousand miles from his home source, roots.
■^The Japanese view the American system of laying off 
people from their jobs as barbaric. Recently, in 1970-1971, 
American scientists and engineers, as well as blue collar 
workers, experienced overnight the collapse of their status- 
supported world, as their jobs disappeared without warning.
1 RIn American epic cowboy films, the lone rider, seemingly 
without background or family connections, without roots, 
courageously and often singlehandedly coping with adverse 
nature and malevolent humans, is a recurring theme— as in 
Shane and Will Penny. In the end, the hero generally rides 
off toward more anonymity, if not oblivion. Herein may be 
found a symbol of many lives.
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Also, the aforementioned fear of Involvement, the widespread 
distaste of getting too close to others, the fear of emotional 
demands, all tend to isolate. Nevertheless, human need for 
close contact continues unabated. Hence, as Henry indicated 
(1963s1^5 )i extreme emotional demands are put upon the only 
outlet left for viable close human contacts, the nuclear 
family. Sometimes the strain on two (or one) frail parents, 
beset with job and outside concerns,,is too much. Emotions 
and frustrations boil over in violence, and/or the sociali­
zation and personality of the children suffer— the result is 
a new generation that is even more isolated. Some, parent 
and child, maintain emotional barriers even within this 
minimal family, avoid closeness, retreat into their protective 
autonomy, yet are highly conscious that one should strive 
to be "well liked" outside the family— by the peers (Henry 
1963:323,1^9).
Unchanging Values; Peer Approval. Peer approval, as 
a major determinant of the normative man's status and there­
fore self worth rather than self approval, the "inner- 
directed" personality— if it ever really existed— appears 
as imperative now as was noted in Chapter 2 in the various 
historical observations and evaluations. Greater democrati­
zation of government bodies and advisory boards enhance this 
power, as 18-year-olds are put on Planning Commissions, 
workers get more say in management, colleges share part of 
their governance with faculty senates, and college committees 
allow students to participate in decision-making. A kind
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of nascent work-stead collaterally system is thus cultivated. 
It differs from the unique Japanese workstead-as-family, 
boss-as-father setup, in that the American individual is 
competing without security (unlike the Japanese) in a "driven" 
way with the same peers who are also judging him. As Lipset 
quoted Riesman:
We can contrast the small grocer who must 
please his individual patrons, perhaps by a 
"counter-side" manner with the chain store employee 
who must please both the patrons and his co­
workers, ..
The colleague, like the peer-group, is the 
very person with whom one engages in competition 
for the scarce commodity of approval and the very 
person to whom one looks for guidance as to what 
is desirable (Lipset 1963:131)*
Of course there is still the boss insisting on high standards 
of performance and meticulous conformity in work patterns 
and associated values. Yet the peers are powerfully influ­
ential, too. For instance, though most metropolitan news­
papers are owned and directed at the highest levels by 
political conservatives, the pressure of the working newsmen, 
reporters, and editing staff has since i960 become so pre­
vailingly, and overwhelmingly, liberal-socialist that the 
news and syndicated columns tend to have a "liberal slant." 
Often the content of the newspaper is at variance with the 
editorials (see The Mlssoulian, New York Times, San Francisco 
Chronicle). Note the above italicized scarce commodity of 
approval. Approval, akin to status, or along with status, 
is always in short supply. There is not enough to go around, 
so powerful cultural pressures for conformity continue.
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When they slacken in one way, say for social acceptance of 
homosexuals, or of couples living together out of wedlock, 
or of avoidance of the draft, they usually tighten in 
another, as the peer group pressure gets more levers.
The Protestant Ethic "Engine." Equally powerful and
equally influential on the achievement value ("syndrome",
some would say) is the embodiment, the characterization of
the work-is-virtuous value, that the historians inaccurately
20label the Protestant Ethic. Periodically avant garde 
social observers adjudge the trait obsolete, dying or dead. 
Originally this value was religiously conceived by the 
1600*s Calvinistic Puritans as allied to salvation. In time, 
by the 1800's, it was modified secularly to equate goodness 
and morality with success. Through American history this 
moral value of the drive to achieve, the worship of success 
has, especially in the American modal character, consciously 
or unconsciously been a mighty ideological and folk value 
reinforcement of the autonomous achievement ethic. A man 
deemed good succeeds careerwise and financially, and gains 
status and respect, A man who does not succeed is of question­
able worth. His status is relatively undesirable; his char­
acter is suspect.
20 "Puritan Ethic" would have been a more apt rubric 
recognizing the English and American Calvinistic origins of 
the concept. Actually, Catholic peasants from Europe in the 
1900's carried this value into the U.S. just as strongly as 
Protestants. The 70 years' experience of the local (Alameda 
County, northern California) Catholic Portuguese reflected hard 
work and belief in hard work, saving, and delayed gratification, 
as much as any Northern European Protestant...Like the old 
Puritans they judged a man partly on how hard he worked, and 
partly on how much success he made with it.
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Ralf Dahrendorf (1961s205)t a German observer of 
American values, held that the alleged decline of the Pro­
testant Ethic was highly premature; that the actual decline 
of the work-success ethic in the dominant majority was nil,
It continued to be almost the most dominant value of the 
mainstream culture, wheie a man to be respected must work 
hard and.we11 to achieve, attaining heights publicly approved. 
Ten years after Dahrendorf, despite the "counter culture", 
the growth of "street people", of a few mainstream "drop­
outs" who do not compete, there has been no mainstream 
lessening of this drive to success. If anything it has 
intensified as it has broadened to include not only financial 
success as businessmen but acceptable alternates for the 
liberals who reject direct profit-making success. It has 
included ever more strongly aspirations to achieve as self- 
employed or semi-independent professionals— doctors, lawyers, 
scientists, planning consultants, marriage counselors, edu­
cational specialists, university professors, journalistic 
pundits. Most of these have come to constitute a new status 
elite initiated through the competitive rites of threshhold 
achievement in postgraduate studies, a system roughly 
parallel to the classic Chinese scholar-gentry system.
As noted above, the "able operator", if he is in a 
position to do so, avoids retirement and consequent loss of 
status to the end. Multi-millionaire Kennedy^ and Rocke­
fellers continue to work all their lives, well past 65«
Roger M. Blough, who "retired" as Chairman of the United
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States Steel Corporation in 19^9» and. who is financially 
well off with a $70,000 annual pension, continues to work 
full time practicing law in his old firm, James Roche, who
"retired" in 1971 as Chairman of General Motors, works
steadily on many boards and directorships. Activity and 
achievement are still the mainsprizes, preoccupations, and 
sources of status, the "greening of America" notwithstanding. 
To counterbalance somewhat the unfavorable picture of 
American culture produced by the reiteration of the negative 
reciprocals of the thematic pair of traits, like conformity 
and insecurity, it should be stated that the culture carries 
also strong positive traits and values, A major counter­
balancing trait in the national ethos and in the cultural
patterns has been the deep-seated American optimism (briefly 
listed in the enumeration at the end of Chapter 2). The 
normative American was idealistic and/or optimistic in his 
faith in the expected growth and role of his country, and 
of the future world development with the United States as 
leader and exemplar. This was the outgrowth, the national 
sum of his optimistic outlook on his own career development 
and success. For the United States’had never lost a war," 
had always been a success. American economic and social 
progress on the whole was ever upward, and most individuals, 
if they worked hard, prospered. Interestingly, when the 
individual reached his ceiling, or suffered a setback, he 
might become disillusioned as far as his own fate went, but 
his generalized notion was that his children and other people
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would "make it." When the Big Depression (1929-1933) jolted 
25% of the people out of their jobs, and 50$ were done out 
of their savings, there occurred the first period of uncertain 
questioning, but by the 19^0's with the great American 
accomplishments in World War II, and subsequent prosperity, 
the general optimistic outlook returned. This feeling pre­
vailed in the 1950's, deemed by critics to be smugness. Yet 
the vicissitudes of the 1930's permanently modified this 
optimism toward the normative American's grasping at govern­
ment-guaranteed social security.
Due to the national confidence crisis of the disillusioned
I
Vietnam Era, 1965-1972, and due to the slowing down of growth 
opportunities, a dark mood of pessimism lately permeates 
the writings of many intellectuals, akin to the expatriates 
of the 1920's such as Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway, 
and similar to the critical expressions of the 1930's,
America has thus frequently been categorized by its own 
critics as a "sick society, a racist, exploitive, eonsumption- 
mad society." Yet the modal American remains on the whole 
guardedly optimistic. He still seems to remain convinced 
that things will turn out all right. This steady optimism 
is not easily reconciled with the stress of the earlier 
part of this chapter on insecurity, tension, feelings of 
frustration at middle-aged mediocrity, and the oldsters' 
overwhelming feelings of failure and alienation.
This may be due to the American norm of values being 
set by the highly successful people and buoyant, indulged,
13̂
"you-can-be-anything-you-want-to-be" youth. And the majority
in middle age can look back to moderately good achievement
in terms of possessions— cars, home, suburban location.
Those who, despite their possessions, suffer from relative
lesser or non-achievement, and who suffer the damaging effects
of autonomous alienation, possibly may condemn themselves
as deviate, at fault. However, to avoid further isolation,
they may dutifully express optimism to the outside world,
and especially to their children— to give them the proper
start in life. For youth, vigor, optimism, and achievement
21are fundamentals in the American way.
Possibly this American paradox of achievement and inse­
curity is an inherent, viable part of a constructive, workable 
value system--with some modifications. If this system could 
be adjusted to bring into full participation these multitudes 
of collections of lone individuals who, in their own or peer 
opinion (peer meaning successful and/or youthful people) 
are not "making it", and who are but "tenuously connected 
with the 'living'," the successful producers, Some incor­
poration of features of the excellent Mormon system of 
everybody participating, everybody being of some consequence,
21Political figures like Jack Kennedy, even with the 
handicaps of a bad back and chronic sickness, carefully 
cultivate their youthful, vigorous image. While seeking 
and fighting to hold status, Iyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, 
and Hubert Humphrey all dyed their gray hair black. George 
Miller, Democratic representative in Congress, was, despite 
a 30-year liberal record in Congress, defeated in the 1972 
primary, largely because "he was too old— 80-odd— and not 
up with the times."
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22might be the direction in which to move (O'Dea 1957*18^)«
Proto European. This paper’s stress on those aspects 
special to the American cultural pattern should not be 
taken in distorted degree in comparison with European develop­
ments. Most of this American divergent stress and singular 
development sprang from the parent British cultural matrix.
Thus these main American developments have been extended and 
magnified projections of already budding West European trends—  
as for example the trend toward individualism, curtailment 
of the family to the conjugal unit, and the like. Once Ameri­
can society took the lead it became the forerunner of parallel, 
though laggard, Western European developments. In the 
aspiration for individual fulfillment the American pattern 
has developed as the accelerated pilot-project, the prototype 
of the eventual paths that the Western World, if not the 
whole globe, has taken or will likely take. These value- 
trait paths include the trends toward autonomous individual 
achievement, toward social and geographic mobility, toward 
overall group conformity in behavior and values and toward 
increasing stress on the attaining of relatively higher 
status. Especially the notion of non-resignation, the 
refusal to accept one's fate, appears in the 20th century 
to have become a world-wide value. Some of these so-called 
"Americanization" movements, as toward individual autonomous
22A non-Mormon critic in 1903» Bichard T. Ely, held the 
Mormon social system to be one of the most perfect participatory 
systems found anywhere (O'Dea 1957*185)• It is notable that 
Mormons needing help, even in old age, are required to do some 
work within their capacities. This is in accord with folk socie­
ties where every member participates according to his ability.
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living made possible by affluence can be seen in developments 
of the last twenty years in Western Europe, and even in 
Japan where the aged are beginning to feel unwanted and 
useless.
Crossroads: Exterior Controls-Partlclpation Need.
As seen by Lowenthal (1^61:3^-36) these American trends 
were the .outgrowths of nascent European trends. In contem­
porary Europe growth was slower in comparison to the outburst 
of property accretion marking successful achievements of the 
"driven" egoistic normative Americans, characteristic of the
epoch 1700 to 1900. In America this explosion of achievement
/
was made possible by the exploitation of the resources of 
a new continent, but the catalytic agent was the cultural 
pattern— the vigor of her youth-oriented, driving, "driven" 
people. This American explosion occurred so quickly and, 
in terms of prior slow labors, relatively faoilely, that this 
growth outran checks and constraints desirable for the good 
of the community. Eventually a day of public reckoning 
had to come. As an example, to combat the wastage of 
natural resources, conservation and ecology movements areI
inaugurating more constraints on the cherished individual 
soonomic freedoms. In the interest of air purity and conser­
vation of fuel3, the private auto operator will submit to 
more and more restraints. These conservation oriented 
public-spirited "Liberals" will become ever more the constrainers 
and controllers of society. Europe may escape some of this 
historic American sequence of unbridled egocentrism—
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"individualism". It may cope better, making gradual adjust­
ments apace with the slower growth of its countries, adapting 
their continuously-evolved control institutions and supporting 
values, as has England. Asian Communist societies are taking 
an apparently effective approach that is fully collective, 
anti-individualistic, totally controlled.
Perhaps the human wastage of spirit cited above in 
Henry and in Clark and Anderson should indicate some such 
conservation of people, too. This would entail a drastic 
restructuring of values and priorities, a consciously directed 
social shift, a break with the past. Yet England in 1820-1850 
managed a considerable turn-about in popular values in 
winning respect for authority, inculcating civility among 
its people, achieving a reduction in crime and an enhancement 
of civic feeling. Through conscious effort the British 
developed and won popular support for these values as the 
dominant norm. Possibly some such application of the renowned 
American skills in operating big organizations could be made 
to rearrange the work system to utilize the autonomous 
achieving individual's skill effectively, but more humanely 
than at present. The goal would be to give the individual 
a sense of belonging, a feeling of consequence In his vast 
society. Kindredly, the whole social mechanism might stand 
some tinkering into, with the aim of making each person 
more a permanent interacting part, with at least a little 
stake and participation in the same, of mattering so long as 
he lives. Henry deemed this widespread feeling of inconse­
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quentialness amounting to worthlessness as our. greatest
American social defect. Henry himself did not reach an
earthly stage of obsolescence, nor one of being "entombed"
23in the abhorred aged care home. ^
The question is still posed whether America's great 
enterprising accomplishments, this historic carving out 
of the 20th century's preeminent national position in wealth 
and power as well as the highest standard of living per 
capita,', is worth the stress price. Is this foremost position 
not only in technological attainments but, since the 1930's, 
in art, music, literature, television, and university learning, 
worth the anxieties, insecurities, and failure feelings 
endemic under the surface of the mainstream? Need the one 
be contingent upon the other? Clyde Kluckhohn (1958a:206) 
quoted Eugene'Burdick's 19^9 posing of the question:
In England there is none of the rise and fall, 
the massive brooding anxiety, the creative stabbing 
of self doubt, the tortures of ethnic inadequacy 
that one finds to a marked degree in America...
It is impossible that England today could produce 
a Shakespeare while the United States or Asia might.
In this man-eating neurotic America there are 
enormous creative currents.
Those English who see only our chrome plating...
^Jules Henry, 1904-1969, Professor of Anthropology, 
Washington University, St. Louis, died "in the saddle" 
September 23, 1969, without having to undergo the old age 
he found our society dreading, disguising and rejecting.
He was of a generation that got its professional start with 
and at the end of Franz Boas' career, aided by the tutelage 
of Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict (Gould 1971:788-792).
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and roaring vulgarity are, understandably, not 
attuned to something vaster that turns and weaves 
just below the surface of American life like some 
raging caged and almost invisible beast.
This beast may destroy us while England is still 
competent and serene.
Burdick went on to become a popular professor of 
Political Science at Berkeley, well-liked by his colleagues; 
then the creator of two best sellers, The Ninth Wave and 
the Ugly American. He achieved doubly high status as a 
millionaire and full Professor, suffered estrangement from 
wife and family, allegedly carried heavy psychic burdens, 
and keeled over dead on the tennis court in his ^O's. 
Autonomous Achievement.
Chapter 5
SUMMARY
Chapter 1 introduced the concept of the associated 
trait values of autonomy and achievement. Their significance 
in American society and its hierarchy of values was illus­
trated by the findings of the Rimrock, New Mexico, study in 
the 1950's, wherein settlers from the Oklahoma-Texas Panhandle 
areas were identified as archetypical representatives and 
therefore cultural carriers of old-time American values.
These characteristic patterns as measured in intensity 
by various tests and as corroborated and illustrated in the 
nature of community activities critically observed by the 
anthropologists, were contrasted with the significantly 
deviate patterns of the adjacent Mormons. The latter, 
though also largely mainstream in culture, were deemed 
distinctive in consciously raising "volunteer" collective 
values and institutionalized group restrains and resultant 
behaviors to a level approaching equal status with theI
normatively more dominant individual achievement.
It was found that both Mormons and "Pantexes" shared 
to a high degree the American values of thrift, hard work, 
and optimism. However, they differed significantly in 
that the Pantexes put greater value on individual autonomous 
achievement— if need be, divorced from the parent community 
and kindred ties— whereas the Mormons tended to aspire and
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achieve within a more collateral framework, within and 
for the group. The Pantexes were more egocentric in orien­
tation? the Mormons’ individual aspiration was more subor­
dinated to group pressures, needs, and approvals. It was 
noted that the characteristic Pantexes* individualistic 
orientation was a product of their culture, a conforming 
to the group expectations, to which they had been socialized 
since childhood. Hence, the freedom of this most represen­
tative group from routine collective constraint actually 
embodied the directional constrains of impelling the individuals 
to strive mightily for individual success, but especially 
In ways winning public approval and, hopefully, renown.
Within the Pantex value system public approval of its 
reference group— its neighborhood embodiment of American 
culture and social values as a whole— was just as significant 
and decisive as was the Mormon need to win approval of 
fellow Mormons, in the village and at the national head­
quarters in Utah.
In Chapter 2 the early American experience as it ori­
ginated In the culture of England of the 1500's, then was 
transposed and transformed somewhat in New England and the 
East Coast in the l600's and 1700's, was studied through 
the eyes of contemporary observers, including Alexis De 
Tocqueville. The comments of these observers were interpreted 
by later social scientists, who concluded that the roots 
and manifestations of autonomous achievement were already 
present in the 1700's and 1800's. They stemmed largely
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from British traits, but blossomed more rapidly and per­
vasively in the lesser restrictions and greater opportunities 
of the American setting. Autonomous achievement flourished 
along with associated traits of anti-authority and belief 
in individualism— self determination of career, aspiration, 
milieu, and family choices.
Other basic American traits included pragmatism, 
optimism, change-is-desirable, wasteful living, generosity, 
idealism, deference to women, pursuit of pleasure, social 
and geographic mobility. Equally significant was the 
acquisitive spirit, as property acquisition was always a 
high goal. The ideal of perfectability went along with a 
self-righteous moral!sm. Most paradoxical in incompatibility 
of values was the ostensible respect for law and order and 
lawfulness that operated in continual tension with a deep 
egocentric bent toward taking the law into one's own hands. 
This contradiction was associated with a kind of perverse 
admiration for defiance of authority.
Over a period of 200 years from the 1650's to the 1840's, 
it was found that these observers were, in broad outline, 
in remarkable agreement as to the dominant value patterns 
as expressed in the socialization of children and subsequent 
behavior of adults. Americans generally were much less
rrespectful of the authority of the state, of community 
leaders, of their family and parents, than were people in 
Western Europe. They were trained to operate independently, 
to "think for themselves." Generation after generation
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struck out on their own, moving west or away-to-town.
Each successive generation tended to feel that it existed 
somewhat by Itself, unbeholden to past generations, free 
to "do its own thing." But each was subject to the ironclad 
law that it must take care of itself. Each individual had 
to carve out his own career, to succeed or fail on his own. 
Success won resounding approvals failure was considered a 
defect of the character, mitigated perhaps by the understanding 
that it was due to bad luck, though "real successful people 
don't have bad luck."
The observers confirmed De Tocqueville's concept of 
"tyranny of the majority," that the real authority was peer 
power. This dominant American concern with outside approval 
produced individuals fearful of and vulnerable to public 
approval or disapproval. Therefore the American's indivi­
dualism had to be expressed in a conformist pattern of doing 
what the peers expected. This was significant in that the 
average American did not, and probably does not now, under­
stand and appreciate how his "individualism" was and is so 
highly conditioned by conformity to the culture's norms 
of expectation of success and concomitant fear of failure. 
Associated with this individualism, these observers determined, 
was a great isolation of the individual; therefore loneliness 
and alienation constituted pervasive norms.
Hence this chapter developed the historical roots of 
the unique American complex or paradox. Normatively, this 
counterbalance of traits produced a tension whereby the
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autonomous achievement imperative caused dominant individuals 
to strike out alone and accomplish much in the economic and 
professional spheres. But they paid the price of being 
cut off from their roots, and walled off from their fellow 
men, except for transitory, insecure, shallow work relation­
ships. Another part of the price was the lack of inner 
security since the norm of worth depended on one's attain­
ments relative to the best of one's peers— in ways approved 
by the society of peers. Peer approval therefore could be 
easily lost. Peer approval depended on how much one had 
accomplished lately, as seen and weighed publicly.
In Chapter 3 the historical findings of Chapter 2 
were validated by the researches of 20th century anthro­
pologists, historians, and sociologists. Through their 
own studies of the American culture, and through cross- 
cultural studies of American values compared with Russian, 
German, Japanese, English and Chinese, a generally consistent 
agreement was reached. These scholars' findings were in 
accord as to the character and dominance of autonomousness—  
independent self oriented decision-makingr-and achievement—  
the awesome drive for attaining high job status regardless 
of ties of family, friends, home base.
Their findings as to the paramountcy, pervasiveness 
and general nature of these traits were so consistent as 
to be repetitious. They validated the historical chapter 
and much of the initial determinations of Chapter 1. They 
agreed that the seeming independence and individuality of
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the American, the purely individual striving of the modal 
personality, in reality masked an unconscious pervasive 
social control Impelling the modal American to strive along 
mainstream patterns of conformity.
As expected, there were great discrepancies between 
the conclusions of the i^searchers and the idealized American 
maxims of cooperation, overt veneration of the aged, and 
devotion of family ties. These controversial items were 
therefore further re-examined in the fourth Chapter.
These authorities tended also to confirm the negative 
reciprocals associated with the stress on autonomous achieve­
ment. This Included the strong pressures to conformity, 
the individual isolation and loneliness. The frequent ego- 
frustration (especially in middle years) and resultant 
weakened self esteem, the sense of failure in middle and 
post-65 years were also cited. They felt that all age 
groups had a strong need for outside (peer) approval and 
recognition, paradoxically coupled with deep-seated fear of 
too close involvement with others. Clark and Anderson's 
study of the aged in San Francisco was cited, giving their•I
conclusions that the values of the society were very hard 
on the aged. They found that American society's stress on 
autonomy and achievement left the aged entirely autonomous— ■ 
alone, isolated, and convinced of their complete failure 
since they could no longer achieve.
The most certain, the most cut-and-dried, validation 
of the themes of the thesis were therefore embodied at this 
point. However, in an attempt to disclose more factors,
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this study went furthers it explored those aspects of the 
theme traits that are not so clearly in congruence with the 
enviable record of the American nation, and its monumental 
accomplishments in achieving national and individual wealth, 
personal freedom of action and self-determination. The 
question was: how, considering the defects suggested by 
observers and researchers, did this society realize such a 
high fraction of the founding political ideals of democracy 
and equality of opportunity?
Chapter k considered these more tentative, less validated 
or even uncertain appraisals. The first part of the chapter 
re-analyzed the historical reports to see whether there had 
been a shift over generations, from the inner-directed 
"rugged individualist" to the contemporary organization- 
abiding man. Evidence showed that child-raising practices 
of the 1700's and l800's, as continued in part by the 
Pantexes of the 1950*s» could hdve produced fearful, anxious, 
driven, peer-pressured personalities in the early period as 
well as the later. But in the earlier times, these charac­
teristics could have been masked by the seeming precocity, 
competence, and resistance to overt adult direction and 
norms.
Hsu's Chinese comparison, first advanced in Chapter 3i 
suggested that the special American weaknesses of high crime 
rate, extremely high divorce rate, family and personal dis­
organization, could have had their roots in this peculiar 
American combination of traits. The chapter followed Ruth
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Benedict's conclusion that there had been a continual growth 
or conversion to a dominant norm of considerable discontinuity, 
as between the character of the socialization of the child 
to cope with life, and the actual process of coping.
^Several authorities noted the modem American tendency 
to shield and protect the child and delay true independence. 
This was acknowledged as perhaps not an original trait but 
one developed over 200 years of affluence and urbanization. 
Therefore, it is possible that this defect has added another 
element of stress to the individual; he is suddenly, at 
adulthood, pitched fully into the autonomous competitive 
battle where his self esteem depends upon success relative 
to that of his peers.
Jules Henry was an Iconoclastic anthropologist who 
strongly contended, on the basis of his participant observation 
researches, that contemporary adolescents were not indepen­
dent emotionally or economically. His findings tended to 
validate the findings of this author in that his subjects 
felt they were supposed to be, or at least supposed to appear 
to be independent, and not indicate need for others. Possibly, 
then, there has been some lessening of work-competence 
independence training in child raising. Perhaps there is 
some validity to Henry's contention that the manifestations 
of successful achievement had become, as in various critics' 
eyes, "an insatiable consumerism" destructive not only of 
natural resources but of human values, of sense of purpose 
and worth, of collateral feelings for others; hence alienation.
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It is possible that these demoralization effects are masked 
by an overt individuality and are worsened by fear of 
others.
The middle section of Chapter 4 assessed, from the 
hindsight of 20 years, Clyde Kluckhohn's delineation of 
five areas of Value Trei.ds and Possible Shifts as related 
to autonomy and achievement. He foresaw no lessening in the 
drive for achievement} despite the "Greening of America" 
type of observation, this author agrees. However, Kluckhohn 
predicted that the autonomy would yield somewhat through the 
workings of group pressure and transform itself into a 
"collective individualism", wherein groups of individuals 
would voluntarily work for community uplift in terms of 
esthetics and community betterment controls. There is some 
realization of this trend in campaigns such as those of the 
Sierra Club, particularly in that the Club is pushing for 
publicly-approved but government-mandated tax and spending 
programs to achieve their ends.
In support of Kluckhohn’s prognosis of greater tolerance
for heterogenity and hence a lessening of the conformity/
patterns, there are numerous current social developments} 
for example, the recent granting of full civil rights to 
homosexuals. However, there is also a tendency for new 
orthodoxies in attitudes to become fixed— like the liberal 
article of faith that increased government spending will 
solve social problems. There seems to be no lessening in 
the main avenue of conformity— -that is, in the imperative
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to succeed along paths approved by peers. The predicted 
trend toward hedonism— immediate self-gratification— has 
not occurred to any full extent, since the deferred gratifi­
cation pattern is still paramount for the mainstream strivers 
as the pattern for success. One evidence is the tremendous 
pressure on students to get into law and medical schools.
Kluckhohn's fourth prognosis, acceptance of government 
controls and services, has become by far the overwhelming 
social development of the times. In forty years, 1933 to 
1973i the United States has become a semi-socialistic 
society under the banner of "’Liberalism, ’’ Yet here again, 
the deep-seated twin traits of the culture, autonomy and 
achievement, have not been rendered obsolete in this govern­
ment-managed and insured society. Rather, these traits 
have been adapted to the enlarged government-overseen and 
government-supported arena of achievement. Although avant 
garde educators decry the stress on competition, for every 
individual "dropping out" of the competition a dozen or more 
new aspirants to higher status shoulder their way into the 
race. In particular, the erstwhile disadvantaged minorities, 
racial and sexual, are now actively spurred to seek their 
rights and psychic fulfillment in pursuit of higher job 
status. Kluckhohn's predicted equalization of roles for 
women and men suddenly appeared to be happening about 1968. 
This development tended to intensify the main trend: compe­
tition to achieve has become ever more acute with women 
now bona fide competitors.
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The latter part of Chapter k enumerated the majort
loose ends needing resolution, making an effort to regain 
perspective whereby the selected study traits would not 
appear out of proportion to other, equally-significant 
American traits. There is a possibility that some of the 
creativity of American :ociety comes from individuals 
seeking individual expression and relief from the cultural 
confines of conformity. Hsu and Burdick held that a minority 
of achievers found individual fulfillment in "offbeat" but 
potentially innovative and useful "pioneering." Such 
idiosyncratic pioneering may become more acceptable and
iwin recognition, probably first in the sciences, technology, 
and academia, and finally in the main social stream of 
society.
The disorganization, degradation, and high percentage 
of deaths among the American prisoners in the Korean War 
gave rise to misgivings as to whether the traits of the 
culture are socially as well as individually constructive. 
Though it is possible to relate this behavior to the effects 
of the autonomous achievement trait-pattems traced in this
I'
thesis, it is not within:the scope of the thesis to attempt 
to resolve the problems of American society and its cultural 
paradoxes.
Chapter then, attempted a reconciliation of the 
great achievements'of the American people with the social 
and anti-social manifestations of the thematic traits and 
their negative reciprocals. The latter part of the chapter
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discussed our society's inability to fulfill Its national 
ideals of universal equality and universal achievement.
Of particular concern was the fact that American acceptance 
of public and community responsibility has been slower than 
Western Europe's. This can be traced to historic stress on 
individualism, privatism, and the resultant lag in controls 
and amenities such as environmental protection, street 
policing, or any form of voluntary public self-policing.
The chapter also traced the massive growth of surrogate 
OOllaterality--the legally created substitutes for original 
family and community ties and supports, those great insti­
tutions, the businesses and corporations and the continually- 
swelling government bureaucracy, That "rugged individual", 
the normative American, shows a willingness and indeed 
enthusiasm to work in these "surrogate kindreds," under 
bosses and in a state of temporary, workaday, enforced 
cooperation. Here he has obviously found a new "El Dorado," 
a means to achieve an individualized livelihood, a channel 
for his aspirations to success.
In toto, this American system resulted in enormous 
achievements— the settlement of a continent, winning of 
several wars, and landing of a rocket on the moon--in 
company with great individual standards of affluence and 
considerable political freedom. Possibly, this autonomous 
achiever, this American, is able to accomplish so much 
groupwise for two reasons: first, because group cooperation 
is the main avenue available for achievement in 20th-century
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America, but also because he probably has a latent deep- 
seated need for approval, and even a genetic or historical 
cultural-social predisposition to work with others. Therefore, 
under the direction and enforced cooperation of an insti­
tutional setting, he works well and achieves, though with 
some productive loss and lack of allegiance and sense of 
belonging due to the omnipresent intense competitive rivalries 
and insecurities. However, if at any time the institutional 
framework is removed, serious difficulties arise within the 
individual; Korean War prisoners and the aged in American 
society are divergent but clear examples. Within the system
l
also are the probably-widespread hidden "failures" and 
"mediocrities," the so-called "alienated" from job and 
society.
The final conclusion of this thesis is that the 
continuing inhumanity, the isolation, the frustration of 
the many, the personal devastation of the. aged, might not 
be a necessary corollary for future national achievement.' 
Revamping the values and social system to provide more 
worth-accruing participatory roles, more recognition of 
each person, more interaction of people— somewhat along 
the lines of the Mormons or of those simple societies as 
in the Caucasus where all have a useful and respected role—  
would be a desirable avenue for American development.
There would, however, have to be a vast shift in values to 
accomplish this.
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